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Abstract
This study presents an attempt to understand the political and aesthetic relationship between two
of Modernism’s most enigmatic authors, Wyndham Lewis and Ford Madox Ford by examining
their novelistic practice in light of their writings on politics and social criticism. A close look at
the use of ironic distance, a hallmark feature in our understanding of modernist fiction, in Tarr
(1918) and The Good Soldier (1915) reveals both authors conscious effort to distance themselves
from their novel’s subjects, Fredric Tarr and John Dowell respectively. In light of both novels’
satirical element, a scathing attack on bourgeois narcissism caused by the wealthier class’
persistent attempts to identify with hollow and self serving social roles through the shamaristocratic prestige created by England’s pre-war commodity culture, and the fact that both
Fredric Tarr and John Dowell are artist figures that somehow resemble their creators, this project
reinterprets Ford and Lewis’ ironic distance as an instance of self-distanciation. From this we can
infer that both Ford and Lewis were invested in the modernist idea of impersonality, not just as a
artistic or literary technique, but as the artist’s only means of escaping the narcissistic and
slothful trap of modern subjectivity, and that, along with the production of modernist art, they
saw a continual self-effacement as the price of authenticity, therefore inspiring in them the
conviction to live as “uncelebrated stylists.”
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Introduction— The Artist as Masochist

The haven from sophistications and contentions
Leaks through its thatch;
He offers succulent cooking;
The door has a creaking latch.
Ezra Pound, “Hugh Selwyn Mauberley”
When his book opens its mouth, the author must shut his.
Friedrich Nietzsche

While writing a review of BLAST only two days after its publication, Ford Madox
Ford makes a strange comment in reference to what he calls “a story that is to what other
stories what a piece of abstract music by Bach is to a piece of program-music” (176 “Mr.
Wyndham Lewis”). Here, Ford has in mind Wyndham Lewis’ “Enemy of the Stars,” not a
story at all, but instead a “play” that Lewis intended as the paradigm of Vorticist literary
production. Ford writes, “I don’t just figure out what it means, but I get ferociously odd
sensations” (176 “Mr. Wyndham Lewis”). Possibly fearing that his comment could be
mistaken for an insult against Lewis’ lucidity, Ford qualifies his earlier statement: “But
then I do not understand what Bach meant by the Fourth Fugue, I don’t want to” (176 “Mr.
Wyndham Lewis”).
Ostensibly, Ford’s opinion of Lewis’ “story” appears ambiguous. Earlier in the
review, he calls BLAST “very amusing, very actual, very impressive now and then” (176
“Mr. Wyndham Lewis”). With this in mind, we should wonder whether or not Ford was
1

serious when he admitted not wanting to understand “Enemy of the Stars.” We should not
put past him the possibility that his remark was sarcastic; Ford was not one to refrain from
cracking a joke. However, in “Enemy of the Stars” Lewis took on a theme that I will spend
the following pages arguing was a significant preoccupation to Ford while he was writing
his review for the Outlook. Lewis’ play deals with the interior struggle of modern artists
who have all but lost their place in society and must discover how to reestablish
themselves to a place of social relevance. The same year BLAST was published, Ford was
in the midst of composing The Good Soldier (1915), a novel that, as I argue, was largely
concerned itself with the place of artists in modern society. Four years later, Lewis would
publish his first novel Tarr (1918), which I also contend echoes many of the same
concerns.
Therefore, when Ford wrote about his “ferociously odd sensations” in response to
Lewis’ play, it seems possible that he was speaking honestly. Ford possibly recognized in
his younger acquaintance a similar anxiety, persistent but not at that moment quite fully
articulated. In what follows, I offer a comparative analysis of The Good Soldier and Tarr
suggesting that this shared anxiety was not only present, but a paramount concern of both
figures during the early years of modernist literary production. Uncelebrated Stylists offers
a comparison of these two novels based on a set of assumptions I will here elucidate. I
argue that both Ford and Lewis’ work figure into the larger historical phenomenon
permeating modernist literary representation that Andrew Hewitt calls “the legitimation
crisis;” that both works attempt to satirize the English bourgeois subjectivity of its
relationship to the commodity industry; and that the formal innovations of both works
imply specific social convictions concerning the artist’ appropriate place within modern
2

society. Reading Tarr and The Good Soldier this way allows me to explore the radical
conclusions that come from both Lewis and Ford’s satires through their formal use of
ironic distance to re-posture artists in relationship to the society they are critiquing through
art. This conscious re-posturing of the artist in relation to the subject of their work,
however, does not imply a moral or epistemological superiority, as ironic distance often
does. Instead, my argument is that it effects the exact opposite, the masochistic effacement
of the artist’s self. This self-effacement does not lead to a superior subjectivity, a higher
way of thinking or feeling intrinsically divorced from the emotional currants of normal
interpersonal relationships, but instead to a flat-out denial of subjective experience as such.
Bourgeois subjectivity is useful to the author only insofar as it can be rendered artistically.
Therefore, the value of an experience for both Ford and Lewis is not in the experience
itself, but in the subsequent act of critical reflection that holds experience in arrest, that
isolates it and immediately challenges its authenticity.
Both Ford and Lewis’ interests in the authenticity of subjective experience,
particularly expressions of desire, stems from the fact that they wrote under the historical
pressure of a shifting emphasis in the place of art in bourgeois society. Beginning in the
eighteenth century, art, like everything else in the capitalist free-market, found itself prey
to the forces of commodification. By extension, the artist experienced a shift in social roles
from autonomous craftsman to entrepreneurial producer. This shift created an anxiety in
artists concerning the legitimacy of artistic creation as an act autonomous from market
demands, putting the artist on the offensive (a phenomenon best exemplified by the satires
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of London literatures like Swift or Pope,1 aimed viciously at writers and patrons they
determined to be more interested in writing for profit than for establishing any lasting
artistic legacy.) This aggression, while still existing in some forms, receded by the
nineteenth-century into the evasive cultural move towards the aestheticism of l'art pour
l'art, the artist’s retreat from the social world into the aesthetic. According to Andrew
Hewitt, many of the early aesthetic practices of the avant-garde worked as a response to
this retreat into the aesthetic. As the term “avant-garde” suggests, early modernist
aesthetics functioned as the expression of a desire to re-legitimate art in bourgeois society
by positing aesthetic praxis as a critique of the commercial forces challenging the author’s
agency within their social context.

Thus, as Hewitt writes, modernists sought to create art that “stressed the mimetic
and interpretive value of aesthetic discourse” by displacing “the meta-discursive structures
of philosophy in favor of framing a discourse on the aesthetic itself; more specifically on
the notion of mimesis or representation” (63). The avant-garde desired an aesthetic
1

In his mock epic The Dunciad, Pope describes the literary market of the 1720’s as a place dominated by the
incompetent “grub street” writers who:
[…] On outside merit but presume,
Or serve (like other fools) to fill a room
Such with their shelves as due proportion
hold,
Or their fond parents dressed in red and
gold. (131-137)

This image (especially placed within the context of his narrative, which is the story of the goddess Dullness
crowning the fictional Tibbald as the king of bad writing) suggests that Pope and many of his peers felt as if the
London literary scene had exchanged the values of wit, insight, and innovation for cheep entertainment, encouraging
literature as a means of profit instead of a site of thoughtful cultural and political introspection. The poem goes on to
complain of “the frippery of crucified Molière” (127) and “hapless Shakespeare” (128) as the victims of banal
imitation, the expected result of a culture more interested in the comfortable and nostalgic styles and themes of past
innovators, instead of supporting the innovators of the present.
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designed to critique the society it inhabited through the very act of presenting its art to that
society. For early modernism, the practice of representation functioned not to deliver
critique, but instead to be the critique itself. Representation in poetry and art should present
an aesthetic whole that is assembled from elements of a fragmentary and incomplete
society, thus the completion of the work subsumes the essential incompatibility of its parts,
like it does in, for example, Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d'Avignon (1907) or Eliot’s
experiments in literary Cubism that resulted in The Waste Land (1922). Novel writing, in a
similar way, has to capture the dissolution of narrative coherence within the act of
narration, making incompletion and failure themselves objects of aesthetic contemplation.

Hewitt Goes on to write, “the externality of the aesthetic is not fixed within the
terminology of a framing discourse (philosophy) that acts as a theoretical mediation
between art and life; rather, it is fixed by the distanciation implicit in the very act of
representation and reflection” (63). Modernist art, Hewitt contends, replaces the evaluative
norms suggested by a philosophical discourse within the text, traditionally mediated by the
editorializing voice of the narrator, with an unmediated representation of the subject
treated within a totalizing framework, the artwork’s form. The result is that, instead of art
expressing a evaluative norm or ideal, the art itself is the ideal, emphasizing the
incompleteness and fragmentation of the subject it represents by re-containing it in an
independent and self sustaining whole.

This praxis of form-as-critique presents itself in the formal structure of Tarr and
The Good Soldier. In this study, I have chosen to place these two novels under the formal
category of satire. However, the use of the term “satire” when referring to a formal
5

category of avant-garde literary practice must be qualified with a note on our
understanding of the term might be effected by the self-conscious stylization for which the
avant-garde are known, least we slip into anachronism by confusing their satiric practice
with satires of the past. In Theory of the Avant-Garde, Peter Bürger suggests that “certain
general categories of the work of art were made recognizable in their generality by the
avant-garde” (19). Thus, Bürger goes on to say, “it is consequently from the standpoint of
the avant-garde that the proceeding phases in the development of art as a phenomenon in
bourgeois society can be understood” (19). From this he concludes it an “error” to read
modernist aesthetic practices as simple developments of earlier formal practices.
For my purposes, this translates into the assertion that Ford and Lewis’ satires do
not merely criticize certain social conditions or practices, but that their satirical practice
also self-consciously reanimates the satirist’s agency in relation to the society they address.
The formal structure of The Good Soldier and Tarr self-consciously imply a specific
relationship between their authors and the readers as receivers of satirical attack. The
rhetorical effects of the novels themselves imply a relationship between author and reader
that is manipulated and mediated through the stylistic practices of composition. Thus,
Lewis and Ford do not limit themselves to passive moral judgments on the readership that
they seek to criticize, but instead actively guide the reader through an experience of their
ideal social relations as mediated by the phenomenological act of reading itself. Like in
most satiric practice, readers come to a realization of how they find themselves implicated
in the deceptive and inauthentic social habits and practices satirized. Tarr and The Good
Soldier present clear indictments of their readership, the English bourgeoisie. However, at
the same time, ironic distance places the author in a position of incongruity with their
6

readership. Ironic removal implies social removal, the authors repositioning of themselves
in a way that justifies their satiric attack by showing that they know the cost of authenticity
and have paid the price that allows them to justifiably critique their community.
The specific focus of Tarr and The Good Soldier’s satirical attack present itself as a
critique of the commodity industry’s role in the formation of bourgeois subjectivity.
Discussing this topic inevitably introduces my study to some of the major theoretical
assumptions of Marxist criticism, which implies a theoretical schematic I cannot introduce
without qualifications concerning Marxism’s relationship to modernist politics. In All that
is Solid Melts into Air, Marshall Berman writes with enthusiastic optimism about the
possibility of a synthesis between the modernist and Marxist methods of critiquing
bourgeois culture. The particular mode of modernist critique we find ourselves engaging in
this study, the modernist satire of early twentieth-century commercialism, appears, at least
initially, comfortable within a Marxist context. Like Berman, Lewis and Ford found the
escapist notion of autonomous art and transcendent thought that pervaded so much of 19th
century thought farcical. The bourgeoisie, regardless of their artistic or intellectual
pedigree, could not escape the material circumstances of their social reality. No artistic or
intellectual activity could ensure transcendence from their class identity or their
participation in the market economy. Thus, the avant-garde’s charge of escapism leveled
against the decadent autonomy of l'art pour l'art and their subsequent demand that art reengage society as critique appears in line with Berman’s understanding of Marxist thought
in relationship to the nineteenth-century bourgeois intellectual:
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As for the orthodox modernists who avoid Marxist thought for fear that
it might strip them of their haloes, they need to learn that it could give them
something better in exchange: a heightened capacity to imagine and express
the endlessly rich, complex and ironic relationships between them and “the
modern bourgeois society” that they try to deny or defy. A fusion of Marx with
modernism should melt the too-solid body of Marxism… and at the same time
give modernist art and thought a new solidity and invest its creations with an
unexpected resonance and depth. (122)
Berman goes on to list Baudelaire, Wagner, Courbet, the Expressionists, Futurists,
Dadaists, and Constructivists as artists who productively synthesized Marxist and
modernist thought. This study assumes some congruity with Berman’s synthesis by
adopting the explicitly Marxist assumption that the means through which goods are
produced and distributed in a society determines the structures of class-consciousnesses,
and that this, in turn, structures the ideological assumptions of the individual in
relationship to their conception of self. We must keep in mind that I am offering here a
study of Ford and Lewis’ satirical practice as it is leveled against the bourgeois conception
of self. Therefore, a fundamental assumption in this study is that the models of
consciousness, and the political implications thereof, found in Ford and Lewis’ fictional
representations of bourgeois society find themselves engendered through some kind of
relationship with, or reaction to, the commodity industry.
However, I must qualify my overarching congruence between modernist and
Marxist critique by pointing out a critical difference between Marxist thought and Ford and
8

Lewis’ more conservative/reactionary assumptions concerning the historical relationship
between the bourgeoisie and the commodity industry. A mention of Marx’s address on the
fourth anniversary of the People’s Paper illustrates this difference well: “We know,” Marx
writes, “that to work well the new-fangled forces of society, they only want to be mastered
by new-fangled men” that “are just as much an invention of modern times as machinery
itself” (587). Here, Marx characterizes the historical emergence of the bourgeoisie, who,
according to Berman, incorporate the “old modes of honor and dignity” into a new market
system that has subsumed their thinking, thus giving old values “new lives as
commodities” (110). However, Marx’s comment implies that the rise of industry and the
invention of modern production preceded the bourgeois subject. The bourgeois subjectivity
is “an invention of modern times,” its narcissistic refusal to acknowledge its own
inauthenticity and hypocrisy presents a subject formation that is generated in response to
capitalist modes of production. Therefore, the plasticity of bourgeois values create a mass
denial of their inconsistency as a necessary response to modernity. Ford and Lewis would
agree that the bourgeois ideals of honor and dignity are fundamentally inauthentic, but
would differ from Marxist thought in that they see the bourgeoisie’s fundamental
inauthentic and delusional sense of self-satisfaction as the cause, not the effect, of the
commodity industry. Therefore, the fault ultimately lies with the subject, and the world
that they have unconsciously created functions as a means of denying a fundamental flaw
in their own self-conception.
As appealing as the idea of the bourgeoisie as fundamentally corrupt may seem for
engendering vicious and unapologetic satire, it leads ford and Lewis into an inevitable trap.
If the bourgeoisie, in their narcissistic drive for self-satisfaction, engendered the rise of the
9

means though which this narcissism finds itself actualized, then their semiconscious
inauthenticity becomes an inevitable trap from which they cannot escape. Paradoxically,
the desire for self-satisfied narcissism creates the demand for the commodity, which, in
turn, creates the self-satisfied narcissism. Narcissism, for the bourgeoisie, inevitably binds
itself to subjectivity because the subject’s desires demand and at the same time are
reinforced by the very means through which those desires are created and sustained.2 Thus
the bourgeois self is a form of narcissism. In their explicitly political and social writings,
Ford and Lewis both appear consciously aware of this recurrence as a problem in their
thought. The problem of the bourgeoisie will not resolve itself until they are displaced, and
since both these authors mistrust and explicitly condemn populist social revolutions that
challenged bourgeois supremacy, they were forced to accept the fundamental tension
between artists and society that they saw as a threat to their authenticity and legitimacy.
The historical relationship that Ford and Lewis presuppose between the bourgeoisie and

2

In A Singular Modernity Fredric Jameson characterizes the Modernist passion for “depersonalization” (136) as a
desire to imagine “some new existence in a world radically transformed and worthy of ecstasy. What has been often
called a new and deeper, richer subjectivity, is in fact this call to change which resonates through it: not subjectivity
as such, but its transformation” (136). In relation to what appears to be Ford and Lewis’ pessimism, Jameson
describes the desire to escape subjective experience as a much more constructive project, a positive work of the
imagination as opposed to a self-effacing objectification. However, like Ford and Lewis’, Jameson thinks that the
bourgeois subjectivity cannot be successfully transformed apart from their total displacement in a “Utopian and
revolutionary transmutation of the world of actuality itself” (136), a proposition that he of course affirms. Jameson’s
insistence on the primacy of bourgeois subjectivity in the formation of relations in a capitalist society lead him to
acknowledge, in the end of Fables of Aggression, that right-wing critiques of the bourgeoisie often seem more
accurate and effective than those of the left because they acknowledge an essential depravity in individual subjects
that leads them to embrace an unjust society as long as their desires fulfilled and their ideal self image confirmed.
Lewis’ genius, according to Jameson, is that he creates in his fiction, “a sham world filled with unreal puppets who
can nonetheless be killed” (176). This allows Lewis to sustain a critique of the bourgeoisie that captures their
essential inauthenticity but that simultaneously realizes that violence against them is real and horrific, thus doubly
criticizing “those passionate private languages and private religions” of European intellectuals, which “entering the
field of force of the real social world, take on a murderous and unsuspected power” (177).
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commodity industry leads to the object of my study. Irony, in Tarr and The Good Soldier,
represents a denial of the self as the only means though which the social problems outlined
above can be resolved.
On the subject of irony, Wayne Booth’s The Rhetoric of Fiction makes several
portentous claims. Booth suggests that irony functions as a community building device,
necessitating “a secret communion of the author and reader behind the narrator’s back”
(300) through an implicitly mutual acknowledgement between the two of the narrator’s
lack of self-awareness and errors in judgment. In the case of Ford and Lewis’ fiction, I
agree with Booth on this claim. John Dowell as a failed narrator and Fredric Tarr as an
absurd protagonist facilitate a mutual awareness of failure and absurdity
between the authors and their readers. However, my understanding of formal irony in these
novels departs from Booth’s claims about the ultimate goal of the author’s “secret
communion” with their readers. Booth asserts that, for readers, the end of irony is “to
collaborate with [the author] on mature moral judgment” (307). If we were to apply this
reading of irony to Tarr and The Good Soldier we would have to suppose that the desired
effect of Ford and Lewis’ irony is to place the author and reader into a superior position
over the novels’ subjects. This would suggest that Lewis and Ford’s goal in writing these
novels was to create some kind of superior subjectivity, a mode of consciousness that
successfully escapes the artifice of bourgeois narcissism. To be sure, the formal irony of
these two novels suggest that Fredric Tarr and John Dowell deserve our judgment.
However, in acknowledging their subjects’ shortcomings, Ford and Lewis do not assert
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their superiority over them. Instead, they imply that an avoidance of either absurdity or
failure on the author’s part requires a masochistic self-effacement.3
The origin of this masochistic self-effacement lies in Ford and Lewis’ doctrinal
convictions about style. For Ford and Lewis, style, the conscious motivation to manipulate
language in a certain way,4 comes in response to what I. A. Richards calls “the impulse”
(86). Even though they are today outmoded, Richards’ observations concerning the
emergence of modernist literary technique serve as a useful corollary for the modernists’
understanding of their own stylistic practice. Richards’ defines the impulse as “a process
3

I realize that, within the confines of this project, I am adopting a rather unorthodox definition of the term
“masochism.” In the classical sense, masochistic self-deprecation allows for the erotic experience of the subject
identifying with the suffering body and the other’s response to the spectacle of suffering. The subject inhabits this
position at the cost of— or as a willful attempt at— obliterating self-awareness by replacing it with the intensity and
immanence of humiliation. Lewis and Ford, as I argue, seek the exact opposite; the escape from subjectivity through
a constant objectification of subjective identification. Therefore, their masochism (even though intentional selfdeprecation is still its central quality) appears more like a stoic practice of de-identification. A corollary example of
this might be the religious rite of mortification practiced by the Opus Dei, an eccentric sect in Roman Catholicism
whose followers regularly beat themselves with scourges to imitate Christ’s torture at the hands of the Roman state.
Their goal is to repeat Christ’s self-denial as it was announced in the gospel account of his prayer at the garden of
Gethsemane: “Father, if thou be willing, remove this cup from me: nevertheless not my will, but thine, be done”
(Luke 22:42 KJV). Thus, Jesus’ torture, and the Opus Dei’s imitation thereof, represents a denial of the vain wishes
and desires (which they locate in the physical body) preventing them from understanding and executing the will of
God.
4

My own thinking on style owes a debt to Roland Barthes and Louis T. Milic. As critics, we identify authors’
“unique style” by placing their texts within the two dimensional landscape Barthes describes in Writing Degree
Zero. Style is bound to the expressive limits of language, which, as Barthes writes, “is not so much a stock of
materials as a horizon” (9). It is within these limitations that we are restricted in discussing stylistic practice.
Individual style, then, “has only a vertical dimension, it plunges into the closed recollection of the person and
achieves its opacity from a certain experience of matter… [the] equivalence of the author’s literary intention and
carnal structure” (11-12). Style is not the use of language to communicate a particular effect, but the result of the
composite forces that differentiate between one author and another authors’ writing. Thus, critics identify style by
noting an author’s deviation from “common” linguistic practice. Louis T. Millic ideas on composition suggest we
can understand style in this way. Style, for Milic, is the author’s self conscious reaction to the “large and perhaps
dominant contribution of unconscious processes to the production of language” (84). The unconscious process he
calls the “stylistic choice” finds itself willfully manipulated into individual style through the author’s confrontation
with unconscious self in the process of revision, where the author differentiates between his style and convention by
a conscious departure from his own unconscious linguistic production.
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beginning in stimulus and ending in an act” (86). He contends that the impulse is
paramount to modernist literary production. In modernist literature, the individual sentence
is created as a recording of the impulse, the moment of response created by an isolated
stimulus. We see this taking shape through Ford and Lewis’ stylistic practice. Ford styled
himself an impressionist. His sentences, their ambiguous adjectives, winding subjunctive
clauses leading to the constant deferral of the object, render in language what Ford saw as
the bewildering effects caused by the impressions of modern life. Likewise, the terse
violence of Lewis’ sentences presented an attempt to render his vitalism in language. The
individual sentence, for Lewis, functions as a response to the biological energy of what he
called “the Wild Body.”
From this, we can infer that both Ford and Lewis’ critiques of bourgeois
subjectivity were internal critiques. The amalgamation of individual sentences that
comprise The Good Soldier and Tarr were not the product of removed judgment, but the
attempt to place the reader within bourgeois subjectivity by representing the impulsive
reactions to modern experience in language. These novels’ stylistic expressions do not
originate from a stance of ideal removal. Instead, they are, for their authors, the very matter
of modern existence. In Lewis’ case, the idea of modernist style as a means of internal
critique must be qualified with a note on his distain for impressionism which we will cover
in-depth during the first chapter. Lewis’ stylistic practice depended on what he perceived
as the energetic force of the modern world, the frenzy of mechanical production and the
proliferation of commodity objects which his fiction mirrors in the frenzied and energetic
proliferation of sentences. However, Lewis is simultaneously careful even on the level of
the individual sentence to ensure that his focus on the subjective does not lead to
13

identification, but in fact consistently distances the reader from these moments of
identification by coding them in figurative language.5 Thus, the reader does not identify
with subjective experience as Lewis’ sentences represent it, but are lead to identify it as a
representation of something else. The literal finds itself subverted by the figurative in a
moment of distanciation.
However, Lewis’ concern was, like Ford, in relating the subjective experience of
modernity. Therefore, the totalized removal of the reader’s sympathetic identification with
the experiences that these novels’ describe require a more totalized act of distanciation
provided by their formal structures. The Good Soldier and Tarr, avoids drawing their
readers’ into sympathetic identification by simultaneously representing the bourgeois
subjectivity and calling the reader’s attention to its inconsistencies. Ford and Lewis
achieve this distanciation through their novels’ formal ironies. To understand how this
works, we can employ Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the molecular and the molar. The
molar, in Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, consists of the ebb and flow of vital energy
through singular desiring machines, whereas the molecular represents the body without
organs’ subsuming of this schizophrenic production of desire into the repressive illusion of
a unified consciousness. This is the process through which bodies’ molar production of
desires find themselves transformed into the chimera of the individual, and the same
process finds itself again repeated when the community of individuals are re-subsumed

5

Jameson characterizes Lewis’ violent and often self negating use of metaphor as “a veritable self-gathering
image—and a sentence producing machine com[ing] in to view behind the dexterous and imperceptible substitutions
of literal and figurative levels for one another” (28 Fables of Aggression).
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into the chimerical totality of the society. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that this
subsuming process of the molar into the molecular create all perceptions of totality.6
We can then read the individual sentences of Ford and Lewis’ novel’s as instances
of the molar, the particular shock of individual experience. Formal irony, the experience of
these novels as totalized works of art, then constitutes the molecular. However, as a result
of Ford and Lewis’ commitment to the impulse, the fragmented and incoherent experiences
of the bourgeois subjectivity as they are stylized on the level of the individual sentence
refuse totality. The moments of Modern experience are incommensurable, and therefore
Ford and Lewis’ art reflect this formally by emphasizing the disparity between the
subject’s false understanding of its own coherence (the illusory molecular) and the
schizophrenic and inchoate molar structures that comprise it. This implies a different kind
of irony than that which Booth maintains in his concept of “secret communion,” because
the subjects are not implicated by the author’s active condemnation of their lack of selfawareness located in the text of the novels themselves. Instead, readers are made aware of
their deficiency when their fragmented and incomplete perspectives are compared to the
aesthetic coherence and completion of the novel’s form.
Irony, in Tarr and The Good Soldier, then looks something like what Allen Wilde
calls “absolute irony,” which he defines as “the conception of equal and opposed
6

We can see the difference between the molecular and the molar in Deleuze and Guattri’s comparative analysis of
schizophrenia and paranoia found in Ant-Oedipus: “Paranoia and schizophrenia,” they write, “can be presented as
the two extreme oscillations of a pendulum oscillating around the position of socius as full body, and, at the limit, a
body without organs” (281). Schizophrenia is an instance of the molar because it “follows the lines of escape of
desire; breaches the wall [of the body without organs] and causes flows to move” (277) and is thus the
deterritorialization of the self. Paranoia, on the other hand, “invests the formation of central sovereignty” (277), and
thus solidifies the coherency of the self by projecting a maliciousness on to the world which it understands as
chronic persecution. Thus it is the manifestation of the molecular formation.
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possibilities held in a state of total poise, or, more briefly still, in the shape of an
indestructible paradox” (21). As instances of absolute irony, Tarr and The Good Soldier
offer expressions of the problem perpetual recurrence of bourgeois narcissism and
commodity culture found in Lewis and Ford’s social criticism. Fredric Tarr and John
Dowell fail to escape the machinations of bourgeois subjectivity because bourgeois
subjectivity is ultimately inescapable. Neither Lewis nor Ford could conceive of a definite
means of breaking the recurrent cycle of bourgeois narcissism and the commodity industry
that did not imply violent revolution. By extension, we can infer that this inescapable
paradox would inhibit the artist from establishing autonomy in a bourgeois culture, and as
long as artists maintained the recognition of themselves as artists within this culture, the
authenticity of their art would be constantly threatened.
Artists, then, had only choice if they desired to maintain the purity of their art and
their free-agency as artists, masochism. The self must be effaced. It is this self-effacement
that Lewis and Ford so masterfully express though their use of absolute irony. For Lewis,
this self-effacement of artists meant the perpetual self-distancing and critical reflection on
their social role as artists. For Ford, self-effacement meant the conscious recognition and
full acceptance of limitation expressed as the artist’s humility. In the pages that follow, I
intend to show that, for both Ford and Lewis, authenticity as artists meant, not only their
acceptance, but also the constant reaffirmation of their ineffable positions as uncelebrated
stylists.
This study began as an attempt to explain, in light of the many similarities in their
aesthetic practice and social criticism, why Ford and Lewis garnered such radically
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different political associations after their work with Vorticism. After the publication of
Tarr, Lewis became for modernism a sort of misanthropic naysayer, violently criticizing
everything about his peers’ art and their stance within British society. Ford, on the other
hand, became a champion of liberal humanism through his later fiction and scholarship. I
assume the germinal difference between their later aesthetic practices and perceived social
positions lies somewhere in the construction of Tarr and The Good Soldier with the subtle
differences in their use of ironic distance.
Chapter one, then, explains the similarities in Ford and Lewis’ social critique as
they are found in their work with the Vorticist flagship BLAST, a distrust of the
authenticity of bourgeois desire and a conviction that society must be reorganized in such a
way that allows artistic autonomy, with some preliminary analysis of how these criticisms
determined their aesthetic praxis as satirists. Chapter two looks at Tarr in the context of
Lewis’ works of political and aesthetic commentary as a way of elucidating how irony
works as authorial self-effacement. Chapter three examines The Good Soldier as a
commentary on novel-writing by placing it in the context of Ford’s social criticism and
literary scholarship, with the ultimate goal of understanding how The Good Soldier’s use
of irony implies a repositioning of the artist within society. The conclusion is what I hope
will be a satisfactory elucidation of the critical differences in their novelistic practices and
what at least some of the social and political implications of these practices might be.
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Chapter 1— “Art thou an Ephraimite?”
Ford, Lewis, and the New Artistic Elite

…And it was so, that when those Ephraimites which were
escaped said, 'Let me go over;' that the men of Gilead said unto
him, 'Art thou an Ephraimite?' If he said, 'Nay;' Then said they
unto him, 'Say now Shibboleth:' and he said 'Sibboleth:' for he
could not frame to pronounce it right. Then they took him, and
slew him at the passages of Jordan: and there fell at that time of the
Ephraimites forty and two thousand.
Judges 12:5-6 (KJV)

On September 1st, 1939 the German army advanced on Poland. Two days later—on
the 3rd— England declared war on Germany. Earlier that morning before the declaration
was announced, tired, nearly bankrupt, and depressed by “the spectacle of another war in
Europe” (248 Myers) Wyndham and Foranna Lewis fled from England to New York, a
place Lewis described in a letter to his friend James Johnson Sweeny as a “stony dessert,
full of shadows, in human form” whose lifelessness he couldn’t have imagined “in his
worst nightmare” (277 “Letters of Wyndham Lewis”). Lewis financed his voyage with the
few pounds he had made off of a recently composed portrait of T.S. Eliot. By the late
thirties, his thinly veiled attacks on his patrons and their friends in The Apes of God (1934)
had alienated him from any immediate means of financial success as a writer. His renewed
interest in panting, then, became a way for Lewis to revive his torpid reputation as a
marketable artist.

18

However, renewing his career as a visual artist had offered Lewis only limited
success, a fact that he, in typical fashion, attributed to what he felt was the British people’s
chronic hostility to innovative artists.7 Also, in spite of his recent recantations of his earlier
support for Nazism in The Hitler Cult (1939) and The Jews, Are They Human? (1939),
Lewis still bore the stigmatism for Hitler (1931), his infamous formal endorsement of the
Third Reich. So by the time he decided to leave London, there was little evidence to
suppose that he could have done anything further, either personally or politically, to save
his damaged reputation.8 His trip to New York, in short, was the beginning of a selfimposed exile brought on by his satirical aggressions and dubious political affiliations, an
exile that would bar him from his London-based sphere of literary and artistic influence for
the rest of his life. Lewis’ associates thought him too offensive— and he thought himself
too audacious and cunning—to ever again work in London among those artists and cultural
elites around which he had built his career.
Recently, one of Lewis’ former literary associates, Ford Madox Ford, had taken his
own journey across the Atlantic. Ford, however, traveled in the opposite direction. Having
recently completed The March of Literature (1938) and taken leave from Olivet College in
Michigan, Ford was planning a lecture tour with Dial Press when he fell ill. At 65, Ford
7

In a review of an exhibit showcasing the work of British painter Mark Gertler, Lewis lashes out furiously against
the many “crimes against art” (405) committed by the British public over the course of his career: “Have you
noticed,” he writes, “in later-day England how artists show great promise, often, and then ‘go off’’—or actually go
to pieces? It is not the rule elsewhere that artists get worse as they get older. Why that phenomenon is only met with
here is easily explained […] You know how sweet a tooth our public has, how unwilling it is to give its attention to
anything a little severe. How it exerts its slothful, sentimental pressure from the first moment a fine artist reveals
himself ” (“Round the Galleries” 405-406).

8

The Jews, Are They Human? Would not be published until May of ’39, and The Hitler Cult wouldn’t be released
until December of the same year, so Lewis’ efforts to publicly distance himself from the Nazis arrived far to late to
have any significant impact on his current social situation.
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was still active as both a writer and a promoter. At the onset of his illness, he was in the
midst of negotiating the publication of his massive three volume travel tome The Great
Trade Route (1937) and working on an outline for Professors Progress, his fourth in a
series of explicitly anti-leftist political satires, and the intellectual inheritor of past political
satires like Mr. Flight (1913), The Marsden Case (1923), and Vive La Roy (1936). He was
actively involved with Allen Tate and his literary circle and still in close correspondence
with Ezra Pound (whom he had tried, much to the poet’s chagrin, to get a teaching position
at Olivet). Before his abrupt break with Dial, Ford had been active in promoting the work
of young poets and writers as he had done since his time as editor of The English Review.
Before his bout of ill health, Ford had been in contact with Tate about spending the
summer in North Carolina with the Tate family. However, when his doctors told him that
“a long course of French cooking” (138 “Letters of Ford Madox Ford”) was the only thing
that could restore him to health, Ford broke his plans with Tate. On the 30th of May, he and
his wife Janice sailed to France with plans to spend the summer in Havarti. They made it
as far as Le Havre before Ford began to need serious medical attention. Julie moved him to
the Clinique St. Francois in Deauville on the 24th of June. Two days later, Ford, who had
authored thirty-six novels and had been at least partially responsible for promoting the
early literary careers of D. H. Laurence, Katharine Mansfield, Jean Rhys, Ezra Pound, and
Wyndham Lewis, died of heart complications.
It’s worth contemplating whether, had the circumstances around Ford’s death been
different, Lewis would have contacted his old literary associate asking for help. Lewis was
notably resentful of Ford at times, as he was towards many people who tried to help him.
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He was also remembered at times to adopt a particularly vicious attitude in attacking
Ford’s art.9 According to Jeffery Meyers, Lewis, upon hearing of Ford’s death, flippantly
commented to Ezra Pound that he “was not a ‘Fordie-fan’ and never had “been able to read
more than a few lines of his fiction” (29). Ford, consequently, had always taken care to
keep a professional distance from what could be Lewis’ caustic and uncouth social and
literary practices. Commenting in his typically tongue-in-cheek style on his affiliation with
Lewis, Ford once wrote, “my motives [for endorsing the Vorticist movement] you will
observe to be entirely cowardly … I support these young men simply because I hope that
in fifteen years time Sir Wyndham Lewis, Bart., P.R.A., may support my claim to a
pension on the Civil List” (“Mr. Wyndham Lewis” 175). Ford had granted Lewis his first
publications when he ran several of his travel sketches in the English Review,10 but always
took care in his later years to regard Lewis as somewhat of a novelty,11 a force to be
reckoned with rather than a peer.

9

In Portraits from Life, Ford recalls a particularly disgruntled Lewis informing him that, “[y]ou and Mr. Conrad and
Mr. James and all those old fellows are done… exploded!... Fichus!... Viux jeu!... No good!... Finished!” (290
ellipses appear in the original). Its worth noting, however, that Ford enjoyed these unsolicited attacks, citing them as
evidence of the youthful virility that would save English art.

10

In 1909, Ford published “The Pole” in his May issue, followed by “Some Inkeepers and Bestre” and “Les
Saltimbanques” in the June and September issues respectively. According to Myers, when Ford, who was a
notoriously inept businessman, was at one point late in his payment for one of the stories, Lewis retorted by calling
him “a shit of the most dreary and uninteresting type” (28).

11

In his celebrated but largely suspect recollection of his first meeting with Lewis, Ford writes: “He was
extraordinary in appearance … He was very dark in the shadows of the staircase. He wore an immense steeplecrown hat. Long black locks fell from it. His coat was one of those Russian looking coats that have no reveres. He
had also an ample black cape of the type that villains in transportine melodrama throw over their shoulders when
they say “Ha-ha!” He said not a word” (“Return to Yesterday” 389-390). Here Ford capitalizes on Lewis’ sinister
persona in a way that subtly implies both impressive personal eccentricity and culpability.
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However, regardless of their public attempts to distance themselves from each
other, Ford and Lewis shared several prominent similarities regarding their social criticism
and their novelistic practice. As I will argue, both Ford and Lewis were invested in
reinstating past social hierarchies onto British culture. Both thought that the orderly
ascendancy of British cultural life had collapsed under the pressure of Europe’s
industrialization and the rise of a commodity industry. Both thought that this was
detrimental to the future of Western art, and that the reinstatement of the artist to a place of
social significance and guaranteed free agency was the starting point for finding a remedy
for cultural decline. Many of these social concerns effected the way Lewis and Ford
represented the bourgeoisie in their novelistic practice, in that both authors capitalized on a
particular use of ironic distance to represent their subjects. In this study, I argue that the
relationship between Ford’s pre-war novel practice as a social satirist must be re-examined
in relation to its similarities to Lewis’ own developing practice as a satirist. Furthermore,
we must examine these similarities in light of their abrupt post-war break, a disparate
trajectory that leads us to regard Ford as a champion of humanism and political liberalism
and to suspect Lewis as an authoritarian and possibly even a fascist. In what follows, we
will attempt to understand, from an aesthetic point of view, how two artists who shared
similar social prejudices could so radically deviate; how Ford could end his career as a
novelist with his four masterpieces of Liberal humanism, the Parades’ End Tetralogy and
Lewis could go on to earn his reputation as “the Enemy.”
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Lewis' Satire as a Rhetorical Shibboleth

If this study aims to understand, from more than just a historical or biographical
point of view, why two novelists with similar aesthetic interests and political commitments
diverged radically from each other in the space of less than a decade, then the first step
should ostensibly to be to establish a firm and lasting connection between these aesthetic
interests and political commitments. We can facilitate such a connection from reading the
social critiques implicit within these experiments. If both Ford and Lewis thought that the
decay of their contemporary culture could be reversed by the reinstatement of the artist to a
place of social significance, then we can read their innovative use of ironic distance in
relation to the content of their satires as a kind of fictional re-imagining of the ideal
relationship between the artist and the rest of society.
In Lewis' case, Fredric Jameson has already provided a detailed analysis of the
conjunction between aesthetics and politics on the level of the individual sentence in
Fables of Aggression. In his study of Lewis' art, Jameson positions Lewis as a seminal
figure within the emerging critiques of capitalist ideology that would define 20th century
thought. Jameson argues that Lewis separates himself from many of his artistic
contemporaries through a "'populist' component" in his literary production, that is
"expressed through his stylistic practice," which is itself "mediated by the excitement of
the machine and of a mechanical production" (16). The immediacy of Lewis' style draws
from the energy of modern mechanization to engender his social critique. As a result,
Lewis' "violent critique and repudiation of all the hegemonic ideologies of the
parliamentary bourgeois state may be taken as a figure for the crisis and fragmentation of
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the subject itself" (18). Lewis' novels, then, understand the relationship between the ego
and fragmented individual subject as a mirror to the relationship between ideology and the
fragmented society. The narrative treatment of these crises present a reimagining of these
fractured relations that speaks to both public life and private experience, one that is both
explicitly political and aesthetic. This study seeks to expand upon Jameson's reading to
meet its goals in understanding both the suddenness and completeness of Ford and Lewis'
break.
However, working with Jameson's project entails a confrontation with more recent
critical attempts to challenge the integrity of the relationship between modernist social
critique and aesthetic experimentation. In his theoretical assessment of modernist
aesthetics, Peter Nicholls advances a now popular claim that avant-garde preoccupations
with "the new" as a category of formal artistic experimentation arose primarily as a
commercial venture. His reading hinges on the idea that modernist poets, beginning with
the work of Baudelaire, Rimbaud, and Mallarmé, sought to "cultivate an essentially closed
model of the self" (4) as an appeal to, instead of a critique of, contemporary bourgeois
sentiments of disinterestedness and individual social superiority. His reading includes the
"men of 1914" in the race to commercialize a new aesthetics by pointing out that Pound's
dislike for impressionism stems from its dependence on what Nichols calls its "intellectual
passivity" (171) and that, in Pound’s estimation, Italian Futurism presented nothing more
than an accelerated form of impressionism.
In Nicholls’ view, Lewis and Pound’s desire for an active, action-based aesthetic
caters to a popular sexism that values masculinity through its implicit connections to social
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dominance, intellectual superiority, virility and individuality. These sexist notions certainly
present themselves in early Vorticist art, but we cannot limit the Vorticist movement to
nothing more than an ambitious commercial enterprise. As the most prominent locus of
early modernist thought, the pages of BLAST imply that the Vorticists’ attempt to make a
place for themselves in the British art scene presented a means of criticizing the hypocrisy
of the middle-class preoccupation with attitudes of social superiority and masculine
virility. An examination of Lewis’ rhetorical stance toward popular culture in BLAST
displays his ironic repositioning of the officious attitudes of individual superiority in
relationship to the way the culture industry creates these attitudes. In what follows, I argue
that Lewis' idea of modernist agency, at least as it pertains to the relationship between
avant-garde artist and popular market, cannot be reduced to a simple commercial ploy.
More importantly, however, I claim that we lose important aspects of Lewis' social
criticism when we reduce the Lewis' attempt to communicate to the British public to a
matter of commerce.
In line with Nicholls, both Paul Peppis and Rod Rosenquist offer acute historical
analyses of early modernism's commercialist sensibilities by tracing the development and
increasing popular appeal of avant-garde techniques of self-promotion. Their readings
focus on early modernism's most relevant site of direct contact with the English public, the
June 1914 edition of BLAST. Peppis, focusing on the nationalistic dimension of early
English modernism, reminds us that one of the three proclaimed goals behind the creation
of BLAST was to "publicize their art as England's— Possibly Europe's— premier art
group... as a defense against foreign occupation and encroachment, especially the Futurist
effort to 'occupy' the English art market" (85). Peppis cites this nationalistic reaction to
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Fillipo Marinetti’s Futurist asthetic as an entrepreneurial ambition. Lewis's self proclaimed
superior sense of the "new" presented a means by which the Vorticists could dominate the
European art market. In his treatment of BLAST, Rosenquist points out that the
"antibourgeois oppositional stance of many of the avant-garde artists was actually solicited
by the masses they confronted," concluding that the "scandal, outrage, and militaristic
fervor of avant-garde" served the angst-ridden and aggressive public sentiments of pre-war
Britain. Both these readings imply that the avant-garde's brief pre-war success came as a
result of both an ambitious promotion on the part of the artists and an accepting
temperament on the part of the receiving public. The artistic and literary climate in pre-war
Britain then appeared hospitable for the emergence of modernist innovation as a
marketable enterprise, with both the suppliers and consuming public willing, for different
reasons, to "do business" with each other.
However convincing they may appear, these arguments aimed to reduce early
modernism to commercial concerns carry inconstancies in both their treatment of the artists
and the public they addressed. First, we must acknowledge the fact Vorticism was not a
commercial success. The Vorticsts held only one major exhibition before the war. The
Rebel Art Centre stayed open for only four months, and its artists were forced to give
lessons home decor painting to keep its doors open for that period of time. The Vorticists'
most significant achievement, BLAST, ran for only two issues. The war, of course, was a
major consideration in the Vorticists flagging success. Two of the movement's central
figures, Henri Gaudier-Brzeska and T. E. Hulme, died on the frontlines. Those who stayed
behind found little notoriety as a group (even though Eliot, a latecomer who was identified
himself with Vorticsm only marginally, found financial success as a poet later in the
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twenties), and soon after Lewis left for the frontlines in 1916, the group disbanded.
Looking back, Lewis himself thought the movement was underserved by the public. In the
pamphlet for a a 1956 exhibition of his work in the Tate gallery, Lewis took care to
distance his late career from its origins in collective action: "Vorticism, in fact, was what I,
personally, did, and said, at a certain period" (451 “The 1956 Retrospective”).
Even if the British public did not seem as enthusiastic to welcome the rise of a
London avant-garde as Peppis and Rosenquist would lead us to believe, with the artists
there does appear a tension between elitist integrity and self-promotion. It is reasonable
initially to see how artists so explicitly antagonistic to middle-class commercial
sensibilities could discredit themselves by announcing their arrival through commercial
mechanisms—the loud and spectacular manifestoes and advertisements that permeated
BLAST— that their writings should ostensibly reject. The seemingly commercializing
elements of BLAST could cast an unfavorable light on the authenticity of Lewis selfproclaimed position as a cultural elite dedicated to arbitrating aesthetic and stylistic
innovations designed to transcend the passé conventions of his cultural moment. However,
we must at the same time acknowledge the fact that, if he chose to take both his social
criticisms and his aesthetic innovations seriously, Lewis could reasonably desire a
substantial amount of public recognition for them. Thus, we can re-imagine Lewis'
situation as one where he has to find a way to fully confront and at the same time
distinguish his group from the class and culture they sought to reform.
This tension between elitist integrity and the desire for recognition, the desire to
engage with and stand above popular culture, should cause us to take a second look at
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Lewis’ techniques for promoting Vorticist art. BLAST'S aggressive self-promotion in the
form of artistic and political manifestoes and the Voticists’ vigorous participation in the
British pre-war project of nationalist revival suggests that Lewis was actively concerned
with the precariousness of his position as a social critic. As the primary architect behind
BLAST'S promotional apparatuses, Lewis shows his readers an awareness of his precarious
stance as both social critic and arbiter of high culture. The apparent hypocrisy bound up in
BLAST’S advertisements and manifestoes display Lewis’ conscious attempt to present
BLAST as a rhetorical device designed to persuade his readership to react to Vorticism in a
way that mirrors both his aesthetic and social vision.
By the time that Lewis and Pound began to imagine a British avant-garde, the
manifesto as a genre of literary production had already earned a dubious association with
commercial culture. This was due partially to the fact that the avant-garde manifesto itself
works as a kind of advertisement. On the subject of the avant-garde manifesto, Alain
Badiou reminds us that, "the Manifesto is only ever a rhetorical device serving to protect
something other than what it overtly names or announces," because "there is no
metalanguage appropriate to artistic production... it is thus in the nature of declarations to
invent a future for the present of art" (139). The new cannot draw enough attention to itself
so that its public can recognize it as such. One of the foibles of artistic innovation,
especially modernist literary innovation, which places so much emphasis on the minute
intricacies of the individual sentence is that it presents itself as "always precarious and
almost indistinct" (140), as Badiou explains:
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Real action exists in such a way that that it has to be pointed out and
emphasized in loud proclamations, rather like the circus ringmaster amplifies
his calls and orders a drum roll so that a pirouette on the trapeze –novel and
daring, but also extremely fleeting— will not be ignored by the public. (140)12
Real innovations in the moment require false promises about the future, so the audacity of
the avant-garde manifesto serves a protective function to the art it seeks to bolster. This
appears especially relevant in the case of the English avant-gardists, who faced a public
still convinced, over forty years after Matthew Arnold's demand for cosmopolitan
enlightenment, that English culture was essentially provincial. Such a public would appear
largely skeptical that their culture could or should even try to compete with the innovations
taking place on the European continent.
Lewis, as a latecomer in the continental avant-garde art scene and an avowed
competitor with Marinetti’s Futurist movement, confronted the manifesto as a form both
necessary for artistic innovation and an increasingly notorious element in the dissolution
between high art and popular culture. However, the particular need for Badiou's "rhetorical
envelope" gave Lewis' a unique opportunity to project his anti-bourgeois stance onto the
culture he sought to address. Martian Puchner points out that BLAST'S manifestoes present
12

Another term-set we can use to explain this phenomenon comes from Pierre Bourdieu’s observation that “a
successful revolution in literature […] is the product of the meeting between two processes, relatively independent,
which occur in the field and outside of it.” He goes on to explain the avant-gardists that desire to “break with current
norms of production in defiance of the expectation of a field can usually only succeed in imposing recognition for
their products by virtue of external changes” (252-253). Like Badiou, Bourdieu maintains that the subtleties and
intricacies of avant-garde artistic innovation, in order to achieve recognition as true innovation through the creation
of a legitimate space of cultural production, has to enact certain exaggerated social gestures that capitalize on other
“ruptures” which “change the power relations” (253) within other cultural fields, particularly political revolutions.
This notion presents itself as especially relevant to our study of Lewis, who as we will see, often capitalized on the
rhetoric of populist revolutions even though he generally distrusted their merits.
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one of Lewis' early attempts to define his notion of satire as the center of his aesthetic
practice. Puchner reminds us that Lewis’ used the manifesto largely as an attempt to
simultaneously compete with and to satirize the avant-garde tradition of manifesto writing
on the continent, particularly the revolutionary fervor of Marinetti’s manifestoes. Lewis,
when it came to politics, the masses, and popular culture, largely denounced both the
Marxist and Fascist notions of populist social revolution—not because he was in any way
invested in maintaining the status quo, but instead because he didn’t think that social
revolution was the business of popular culture or the public in general. “Lewis denies the
unleashing of social revolution,” Puchner writes, “… and restricts the ‘true’ revolution to
some neatly confined aristocratic elite” (59). BLAST’s manifestoes, then, over-act or
exaggerate the revolutionary tendencies of the avant-garde manifesto to both legitimate the
Vorticist movement and to mock their revolutionary ambition via commercial promotion to
a mass audience. Thus, in the case of BLAST, Lewis “adopts the genre of… [popular]
revolution… to contain its consequences” (60 Puchner).
If Jameson is correct in arguing that Lewis' writing seeks to effectively re-imagine
society through its aesthetic structures, we can see how BLAST mirrors this impulse. With
the combination of satirical distance and the manifesto’s rhetorical purpose, Lewis
attempts to transpose the aesthetic hierarchies implied by BLAST'S manifestoes into the
actual reception of Vorticist art. Satire, through its use of ironic distance, exaggeration, and
overt mockery, often purports to affect the exact opposite of what it literally suggests. The
manifesto, conversely, demands a sincere reaction by simultaneously acting and
intentionally expecting its readers to react in a particular way. For example, Lewis blasts
those who "still crack their whips and tumble in Piccadilly Circus, as though London were
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a provincial town" (19). Here Lewis condemns a culture saturated in the illusion that
England can avoid confronting the modern age, a culture in denial of the fact that the
sleepy complacency of nineteenth-century social convention no longer presents itself as an
option. However, in the next line Lewis provokes a response: “WE WHISPER IN YOUR
EAR A GREAT SECRET. LONDON IS NOT A PROVINCIAL TOWN" (19). Ironically,
he presents this whisper as a shout. The Vorticists "secret" is a public proclamation to
action. In a similar way, the opening manifesto demands a following: "A VORTICIST
KING! WHY NOT? / DO YOU THINK LLOYD GEORGE HAS THE VORTEX IN
HIM?” That Lewis elected Lloyd Gorge, a figure associated with the populist sentiments
he reviled, as a possible convert suggests that he sought to distance himself from what
could be the potential effects of his rhetorical strategy.
From this, we can infer that Lewis' employment of satirical technique in the
manifesto attempts an inversion of the respective allegiances of his readership. Lewis'
critique of bourgeois culture rests in the idea that “real” or authentic action has largely
become separated from “real” or actualized desire, and both individual action and desire
have found themselves redirected by mimesis into mass action and desire. In short, the
British middle-class actualize their individuality, in terms of both action and desire, by
mimicking everyone else who claim the sanctity of their own individuality—the bourgeois
establish their individuality by imitating their peers. BLAST announces that it intends to
“present an art of individuals” (8). Here we can see Lewis' treachery toward his audience
emerging. BLAST duplicitously presents a mass call for artistic individuality,
simultaneously mocking and affecting the kind of desire/imitation reversal he despises.
Readers aligning themselves with BLAST'S proclamations in effect embodied the very
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thing Lewis despised about bourgeois culture, and his desire for success with the Vorticist
flagship simultaneously expressed his misanthropic disgust towards his readership. In
essence, BLAST'S manifestoes sought to create a rhetorical shibboleth, identifying his
enemies by inviting them to swear allegiance as allies.
As to why Lewis would want to make enemies of his allies, BLAST itself seems to
suggest that many of Lewis' more sincere social commitments required that he make allies
of his enemies. BLAST repeatedly suggests that it seeks to foster the individual artist
through violent intellectual opposition. The opening polemic announces that BLAST seeks
to "destroy politeness" (7) and in the first manifesto abstracts its intended rudeness into a
metaphysical principle; "we start from opposite statements of a chosen world. Set up
violent structures of adolescent clearness between them" (30). The value of opposition here
appears to lie neither with an apparent victory of one abstracted "side" or anything like a
synthesis of both sides, but in the opposition itself. The Vorticists fight "always for the
same cause, which is neither side and both sides" (30) and also simultaneously their cause.
The Vorticist vision then appears to weave a sort of tapestry of violent intellectual
opposition, where antagonism reigns as the supreme value because of its ability to unite
authentic individuals in a common artistic practice without falling back into passé social
patterns of mimesis. From this vantage point alone, however, it is not clear whether Lewis
intends this statement of principle specifically applies to aesthetic practice or to some sort
of new vision for social relations. In what proceeds, I intend to argue that it applies equally
to both.
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Ford’s Satire as Sexual Shibboleth

Initially, it might feel strange to think of Ford Madox Ford’s social criticisms as
similar to Lewis’. In his earlier career, Ford claimed to belong to the generation of artists
that dominated London before Lewis, Pound, Aldington, and Gaudier-Brzeska announced
their arrival. His people were those anxious and portentous Edwardians concerned with
finding an alternative to “the perpetual torture of incompetent compassion” that bourgeois
liberalism had become, an alternative that doesn’t surrender English society over to either
“malevolent anarchy” or “benevolent servitude” (125 Chesterton). Writers like G.K.
Chesterton, Hiliare Belloc, G.B. Shaw and H.G. Wells spent their intellectual energy
searching for an alternative to modern decadence that didn’t stray into what they saw as the
extremes of anarchy or tyranny they saw sweeping over the European continent. Early in
his career, Ford styled himself a Tory Gentleman and reactionary politico wedged
somewhere between the utopian progressivism of Shaw and Wells and the authoritarian
romanticism of Chesterton and Belloc. Superficially, his attitudes were closer to
Chesterton’s. He romanticized the clarity and simplicity of feudal Europe, claiming that if
it weren’t for the influence of Cervantes, “chivalry… might have saved our unfortunate
civilization” (680 "The March"). Ford's early critical writing was preoccupied with
identifying and reinstating the cultural attitudes and practices that Europe had lost with the
encroachment of modernity. At the same time he was troubled by the “standardizing”
forces of democracy, mass education and popular culture “doing away with everything
outstanding” (299 “Memories and Impressions”) and the fact that the forces of technology

33

and industry have made “life much more bewildered than it has ever been” (51 The
Critical Attitude) for the modern subject.

Ford’s time as a Tory gentleman was cut short, however, when the news of his
affair with Violet Hunt and subsequent estrangement with his wife Elisa Martindale broke
loose to the public between 1909 and 1910. By abandoning his wife and taking up with
another woman, Ford alienated himself from his older Edwardian crowd. This persuaded
him to associate with the younger generation of British artists who were unaffected by his
impropriety. However, Ford’s decision to defect to the modernist camp was more than just
a convenient social move. As Michael Levinson points out, Ford ultimately couldn’t
remain at home with his own generation of writers because they failed “to yield
sufficiently to the exigencies of [Ford’s] present, the failure to concede to the
fragmentation, the fragility, the precariousness and to write accordingly” (61). In the
preface to his Collected Poems, Ford wrote, “for a quarter of a century I have kept before
me one unflinching aim—to register my own times in terms of my own time” (327).

Ford’s impressionistic outlook valued above all else a faithful rendering of
subjective experience, what he in his seminal essay “On Impressionism” would call “a
frank expression of personality” (36). In a cultural and historical moment where confusion
and bewilderment had become, in Ford’s view, the defining trait of contemporary thought,
the artist could not shrink from the task of trying to represent the sordid manifestations of
this bewilderment and its inevitable effects on how the modern subject perceives reality:
“impressionism […] is not a sort of rounded, annotated record of a set of circumstances, it
is the record of the recollection in your mind of a set of circumstances that happened ten
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years ago—or ten minutes ago” (41). His project, in a sense, remains conservative. To
recollect means to recover something from the past which the subject now lacks. His
commitment, however, was to the present, to understanding not just how, but why
recollection fails. In recollecting, Ford suggests, the modern subject cannot always produce
a “rounded, annotated” record of events, to experience a complete understanding of its
world, and furthermore struggles to differentiate the past from the present, to stand fully
aware of the modern moment. The pressures of modernity on the modern subject, then,
create a uniquely modern confusion where it can not pull “ten years ago” and “ten minutes
ago” apart. The cause of fragmentation in the modern experience, then, lies not in the past
that is lacking, but in the present of recollection. Understanding the present, for Ford,
became a necessary part of his literary endeavor in a way it had not before.

Thus the increased interest with the subjective, however, did not detract from the
political concerns of Ford’s earlier Edwardian attachments, it just changed their focus. The
period between 1910 and 1914 saw the production of The Critical Attitude (1911), Ford’s
scathing portrait of an England where “clear and objective thinking is a lost art” (131
Snitow), and his first three novel experiments in social satire, The Simple Life Limited
(1910), The New Humpty-Dumpty (1912), and Mr. Flight (1913). Thus, in turning inward,
Ford became more explicitly political than he had been before. The difference is that,
between 1910 to 1915, Ford began to suspect the middle-class English values he had
fought earlier to preserve. By releasing himself from those burdensome Chestertonian
preoccupations that stood to represent the anxieties of a class from which he was removed
by both income and birth, Ford was able to perform a self-conscious reexamination of
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English bourgeois culture, its conventions, its values, and its practices from a subjective
point of view. His satires sought to understand what kind of interior confusion and
bewilderment the English middle-class can inspire through the duplicity of their social
practices. Robert Green claims that this “new clarity,” which he describes as the ability to
“portray credibly the tension between belief and social agnosticism” (81) that fractures the
psychic continuity of the English bourgeois subject, comes from Ford’s admittance of his
“failure to decode” the bourgeoisie’s “complex rhetoric of speech and gesture” and “to
demarcate the boundary between play and life” (80) that defines its social interaction. His
new artistic energy came from an abandonment of what for him was an inauthentic
sympathy with the bourgeoisie and a turn towards criticizing the inauthenticity of the class
itself. In admitting that he did not belong to his generation, Ford freed himself to turn his
critical eye back onto the class he once defended.

Ann Barr Snitow claims that the hallmark technical feature of Ford’s subjective
concern presents itself as an innovative play with ironic distance: “irony is a central
expression of social ambivalence” allowing him to “begin to ask questions about his time
that he had been incapable of asking earlier” (130). Leaving his past associations behind,
Ford could identify more with the creators of BLAST and their interest in using ironic
distance to objectify the painful subjective fragmentation of modern life, reforming it into
something both beautiful and culpable. Unlike the impressionism of Conrad and James, or
Marinetti's sensational Futurism, Ford’s use of the impressionist technique to capture the
confusion of modern thought fit the new Vorticist program because it required the ironic
distance to both attack the delusions of the bourgeois subject and make it into an object of
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aesthetic contemplation. Like Lewis, Ford realized that the bourgeoisie claimed certain
aristocratic pretentions— the responsibility of guiding society and representing its
dominant values and anxieties—while still only educating and refining themselves as
economic leaders. They played at living like aristocrats while still thinking and acting like
shopkeepers, a fact that Ford sought to ironize in his fiction. Ford’s irony takes the form of
a distance between the authorial voice and the fictional subject; a narrative technique that
reached its apotheosis with his 1915 novel The Good Soldier. In The Good Soldier, Ford's
bold and counterintuitive use of a first person narrator successfully distanced the reader
from the subject treated in order to re-conceive impressionism as a method of social
critique.

John Dowell, the story's narrator, suffers from a chronic stereotype of passivity and
effeminacy that the novel's principal characters impose on him. The English gentleman
Edward Ashburnham regards him as a "woman or a solicitor" (31) and Edward's wife
Leonora listens to Dowell like a "mother, to the child at her knee" (53). The principal
insult, however, comes from Dowell's own wife Florence, who feigns a heart condition to
avoid consummating their marriage and conducts a series of clandestine affairs. The
abusive treatment he receives from his wife and friends, coupled with the severe emotional
trauma of the story he tells, leaves Dowell an ineffectual narrator. He often fails to
complete his narration of a significant moment or differentiate between details that are
critical to his reader's understanding of a moment and which ones are superfluous.13
13

Citing and discussing specific instances within the plot of this phenomenon have become critical commonplace
for discussions on The Good Soldier, and I’m not going to spend too much time at this point elaborating on them,
seeing as Ford’s completed 1915 version of the novel will be treated in detail later. However, its worth mentioning
that Dowell’s narration of the infamous excursion to the town of M with Leonora’s faux revelation on the balcony
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Dowell's failed attempts to "keep all these people [his characters] going" (241) and thus
guide his reader through the "sort of maze" (201) created by his frenzied recollections,
revelations, and traumatic impressions, create an emotional gap between the reader and the
subject treated. Dowell claims he's telling the story for therapeutic purposes, to "get the
sight out of [his] head" (7). But his botched storytelling, for the reader, has the opposite
effect. Dowell's mistakes disrupt the conduits necessary for fostering a significant
emotional connection between the sympathies of the reader and the plight of his characters,
thus rendering his subjects in a more strenuously objective light. He informs us of details
necessary for making an emotional connection with the story only after the fact, so we are
allowed for a moment to see the characters the populate Dowell's memory act as Ford saw
them act— aimlessly, lifelessly, like dolls arranged to stand about in the way that people
do.
Thus, The Good Soldier's emotional frustration and cruel ironies present a social
satire which, much like the majority of Lewis' pre-war writing, worked as a send-up of the
English bourgeoisie. The fragment of Ford's novel published in the June 1914 BLAST as
"The Saddest Story" presents a problem of inauthentic desire similar to the problems
highlighted by the rhetorical devices that announced the importance of its arrival. "The
Saddest Story's" main social concern presents itself as a disjunction between identification
and desire, a separation between professed desire and real action that has become the
scourge of bourgeois masculinity. The men in Ford's story substitute the act of identifying
(pp. 44-50), his preoccupation with unexplained details like the “little phial that should have contained nitrate of
amyl” (pp. 112) the night of Florence’s suicide, and his hasty attempt to end the story without recounting Edward’s
death (pp. 276-77), which had presented itself as a driving force in his narrative since the beginning of the third
section.
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their desire in place of the act of obtaining those desires. Mimesis in "The Saddest Story,"
means hypocritically recreating the attainment of sexual desire through language, without
any real action. Dowell, characteristically regarding himself as "not so much a man" (94),
acts as a receptacle for others personalities. As the negation of desire— a man who claims
not to "want" (93) anything— Dowell becomes a barometer for the force of impressions
created by the other characters’ ability collate desire and action. Ford expects the reader to
measure the authenticity of a connection between desire and action by Dowell's ability to
comprehend and react to the misnomers of male sexual aggression. Among men other than
Teddy Ashburnham, "those incalculable simulacra amidst smoke wreathes" (88), Dowell
conjures an uncharacteristic repulsion to the banality of cheap sexual performance:

Fellows come in and tell the most extraordinarily gross stories—so
gross that they will positively give you a pain. And yet they’d be offended if
you suggested that they weren’t the sort of person you would trust your wife
alone with. And very likely they’d be quite properly offended—that is, if you
can trust anybody with anybody. But that sort of fellow obviously takes more
delight in listening to or telling gross stories—more delight than anything in
the world. (89)

These idle and comfortable men who “hunt languidly and dress languidly and dine
languidly, and work without enthusiasm” (89) express—or perhaps more properly,
perform— their sexuality through mimesis. Their desire for authentic action, restrained by
bourgeois propriety, finds itself deferred onto an unconscious imitation of reality. From
sharing these deviant stories of sexual conquest, they find enough arousal to “wake up and
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throw themselves about in their chairs” (89). Dowell gives us an English bourgeoisie of
juvenile boasters, men who devote their intellectual energy into creating narratives about
the things they want do in order to compensate for a lack of actual gratification. In this
instance, Dowell’s puritan innocence amplifies what otherwise might be the impenetrable
distinction between authentic desire and hypocritical imitation. His puzzlement over the
fact that these men “can be offended—and properly offended at the suggestion that they
might make an attempt at your wife’s honor” (89) lays bare a class of men so alienated
from their own desires that they cannot conceive of an implicating relationship between the
“stories” they tell and their actual behavior.

The principal irony of “The Saddest Story,” however, is that Dowell’s innocent eye
and alien stance find themselves unable to detect and root out the one real threat to his
“wife’s honor,” Edward Ashburnham. Dowell’s skepticism acknowledges Edward’s
duplicity, but cannot so quickly register the magnitude of its threat. Norman Leer suggests
that the complexity and pathos of Edward’s character manifests itself as an irresolvable
fissure between a public façade and private desire. “Ashburnham,” Leer writes, “is the sort
of man who always fulfills and perhaps even surpasses his expected social duties … he
plays the part of the dutiful aristocrat, or the good soldier, but this role is so external that it
is gradually undermined by [his] own private life” (76). Edward accepts and even nurtures
this duality because “the sense of responsibility becomes for him a means of publicly
veiling and evading the private sphere of passion and emotion” (76). Thus, the distance
between the virtuous candor of Edward’s public reputation and the litany of affairs
become, for Dowell, the obfuscating epistemic haze he must see through in order to find a
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“haven where … old beautiful intimacies prolong themselves” (88) and to discover
whether his supposed intimacy with Edward Ashburnham was a manifestation of public
act or private desire.

The problem for Dowell however, presents itself as the fact that all he ever sees of
Edward directly appears as a unity. He can’t be sure whether or not he knew the public or
the private Edward, because Edward, in his superior masculine and remarkably British
acumen of coolness and control, never exposes the fracture in his personality. Dowell
illustrates this dilemma with his fantasy anecdote about finding his way into Edward
“private room” to see him:

Standing with his coat and waistcoat off and the immensely long line of
his perfectly elegant trousers from waist to boot to heal. And he would have a
slightly reflective air, and he would be just opening one kind of case and
closing another .

Good God, what did they all see in him; for what there was of him,
inside and outside; though they said he was a good soldier. Yet Leonora adored
him with a passion that was like an agony, and hated him with an agony that
was like the sea. (94)

With this image, Dowell shows us the source of his bewilderment. He can’t “sound the
depths” (87) of Edward’s apparent contradiction because his impressions of Edward all
speak to a staunch English consistency and an unnerving psychic unity. Thus, Ford
repeatedly sublimates The Good Soldier’s dramatic tension— allowing it to resurface in
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the destructive effects of Edward's licentiousness, effects like Maisie Maidan’s death,
Florence’s suicide and Nancy’s mental breakdown. We, like Dowell, never get to see
Edward as anything but a good soldier. We never get to see him act on his rakish impulses.
We can only watch Dowell go through the painful process of trying to trace the effect of
his destructive behavior back to their obvious causes. This is why Dowell often adopts
paradox as a way of evading a conclusive description of Edward’s personality.14 He has to
struggle to resolve Edward’s appearance of moral and emotional unity with revelations of
his duplicity so that he can fend off the constant threat that his meditations on Edward’s
character will simply dissolve into pure aporia.

As opposed to the "Saddest Story," the completed Good Soldier uses Dowell’s
inability to penetrate the illusory unity of Edward’s character as a narrative device that
propels the plot of the novel by offering us a series of tragic events that we, along with
Dowell, must trace back to an absent cause— the libertinism that we always hear about but
never get to see. We should also note that, in the completed work, Ford’s concern shifts
dramatically away from a valorization of action to a narrative stance that expresses the
dangers of unrestrained sexual passion. Read in the context of BLAST and the emphasis
that the vorticists placed on individual action and authentic desire, Edward appears heroic
in his ability to disregard convention and to act how he wants. (Just publicly announcing
his affair with Violet Hunt and divorcing his first wife, it appears reasonable to assume that
Ford could have honestly felt this to be the case). But The Good Soldier’s insistence on the
14

The following description of Edward’s face at the moment of he and Dowell’s first meeting in Nauheim presents a
typical example of Dowell’s paradoxical way of explaining his impressions of Edward’s Personality: “I never came
across such a perfect expression before, and I never shall again. It was insolence and not insolence; it was modesty
and not modesty.”
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destructive capability of this kind of behavior when it is left with no public accountability
for its effects makes Edward into a figure that Ford cannot fully endorse. Edward’s suicide,
along with Florence’s suicide, are not so much the final manifestation of an inescapable
tragic flaw, but are instead the result of cowardly refusals to accept accountability for their
sexual desires and face the consequences of their choices.
However, if we allow a look at “The Saddest Story” as a completed work
autonomous from its latter incarnation, we see, much like with Lewis’s advertisements and
manifestoes, another kind of shibboleth emerging. The principal irony Ford displays in
“The Saddest Story” is that the sensitive and impressionable Dowell allows the
“incalculable simulacra” of the English smoking room to register as a threat towards his
wife’s honor in spite of the fact that we see him passively record their behavior as they
mimetically compensate for their inability to act on any authentic sexual desire. Edward,
on the other hand, receives Dowell’s trust as “just the sort of man you can trust your wife
with,” and then reveals himself as the real threat. Men in Ford’s world either act on their
sexual urges in silence or they talk about their sexual urges without acting on them.
Both patterns of behavior imply a hypocritical duality—a psychic fracturing that
past critics have identified as both a central concern in Ford’s social criticism and an
essential feature in his representation of the modern world in The Good Soldier.15 With
both “The Saddest Story” and The Good Soldier, Ford complicates the possibility of a

15

Mark Schorer suggests this idea of psychic fracture as it relates to Dowell’s narration when he writes: “The
fracture between the character of the event as we feel it to be and the character of the narrator as he reports the event
to us is the essential irony” (ix), and critics including Samuel Hynes (313), John A. Meixner (320), and Eugene
Goodheart (377) make significant developments on this idea.
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modern experience where the subject escapes this psychic fracture between public and
private selves. However, “The Saddest Story” does offer some sort of social distinction.
Using Dowell’s subjective impression of masculine sexuality, Ford strikes a distinction
between Edward Ashburnham and his peers. This distinction lies between bourgeois men
who have fallen pray to the impotency and hollowness of something like a Nietzschean
“heard instinct” and those who actively pursue their desires. In “The Saddest Story,” the
force of Edward’s personality can at least create the appearance of a unified whole—an
authentic connection between action and desire—because his private life is one where
desire finds itself actualized.
This distinction would become increasingly more complex as Ford turned “The
Saddest Story” into The Good Soldier. But in its June 1914 manifestation, Ford’s
Impressionist expedition into the subjective experience of modernity, far from offering a
retreat from the decadence and impotence of middle-class English life, actually attempts to
invade it, using art to reorganize society. Despite Pound and Lewis’ uncharitable resistance
to Impressionism’s passivity, “the Saddest Story” attempts to show that Ford’s
impressionism can offer a viable means of reestablishing those critical social hierarchies
corroded by the spirit of bourgeois conformity.
The conjuncture of these similarities between Ford and Lewis’ aesthetic practice
and social criticism demands more explication. Intuitively, Lewis and Ford’s demand for
the public’s recognition of both the civic benefits of art and the artist’s return to a place of
prominence in society imply an aggrandization of the artist figure. Historically, this is quite
true, especially for Ford, who latter in life would insist that the artist acts, to echo Shelly’s
44

assertion, as the world’s “unacknowledged legislators.” However, as I will show through
my analysis of the ironic formal qualities of Tarr and The Good Soldier, the reestablishment of artists to a place of social distinction conversely required on the part of
the artists a masochistic effacement of self.
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Chapter 2—“Conscience as an Artist:”
The Ethics of Sex in Lewis’ Tarr

It is not a grinning face we object to, but a face that is mean when it is
serious and then takes to grinning like a duck takes to water. We must stop
grinning. You may say that I do not practice what I preach. I do: for if you look
closely at my grin you will perceive that it is a very logical and deliberate
grimace.
Wyndham Lewis
The Joke is always about something else. "A joke [esprit] in fact entails
such a subjective conditionality [...]: a joke is only what I accept as such,"
continues Freud, who knows what he is talking about.
Jacques Lacan

It took Lewis nearly eight years to write his first novel. He completed the final draft of
Tarr in March of 1916, and serialized it in The Egoist between 1916 and 1917 before its first
publication in book form in 1918. What he produced as a result of his eight year project,
however, was a novel that in several ways ironically reflects the turbulence of Lewis’ life during
the time of its composition. That Tarr was completed amongst a frenzy of illicit sexual trysts
makes sense giving that the novel itself presents a sustained meditation on the artist figure’s ideal
relationship to sex. Also, Tarr’s completion during a period of heightened artistic productivity
makes sense in that Lewis’ first novel would prove seminal in later developments in his political,
social, and artistic thought.
In his survey of Lewis’ artistic career, Tom Normand suggests that an engagement with
politics was the inevitable conclusion of Lewis’ social and aesthetic vision—the “last twist in his
spiraling vortex” (130). Lewis’ gestures a turn towards politics as early as the 1915 preface for
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the first edition of Tarr. Here, Lewis explains that he wrote Tarr in response to the failure of
British cultural elites to effect an intellectual revolution powerful enough to liberate themselves
from the passé conventions of modern social conformity. Writing at the outbreak of the war,
Lewis found himself concerned with how “the commercial and military success of Prussia” has
captured “the imagination of the English” (13). Writing his preface only months before leaving
for the front, the patriotic and distinctly ant-German fervor of his writing suggests that his
concern over Prussian influence is political as well as cultural. Thus, Lewis’ art and military
service go hand and hand—a cultural and martial defense of British sovereignty in Western
Europe. Just as his participation in the war presented a actual defense of England’s borders, he
suggests that his pre-war writing presented a literary defense of the purity and singularity of
British culture. Falling under the sway of an exotic foreign culture and temperament, according
to Lewis, repressed the English people’s potential to invest in the development of their own
unique national creative project.
Moving from the public life of nations to the personal life of the educated individual,
Lewis' preface explains how a cultic fascination with Nietzsche threatens the sanctimony of the
individual British intellect. He suggests that, in one of those ironic cultural moments that only a
mass commercial economy can initiate, “Nietzsche’s gospel” (13) of volunteerist elitism has
become a mechanism of conformity: his writings “have made an Overman of every energetic
grocer in Europe” (13). Nietzsche’s rhetoric of individualism has become a marketable
commodity, a means of clustering the mimetic tendencies of the bourgeoisie into groups of
conformist pseudo-revolutionaries: “the Paris apache, the Italian Futurist ‘littérateur,’ the
Russian revolutionary” (13) to name a few. The possibility of a revolution inspired by and
contained solely within English intellectual society finds itself overcome by commercial
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sensibilities. Thus, Lewis’ attitude implies that he does not think a revolutionary change in social
relations possible through art and philosophy alone. He would later make this deficiency explicit
in 1927 with The Art of Being Ruled, arguing that civil government must actively intervene in
defense of its cultural elite to insure that the encroaching hegemony of modern society does not
violate what should be its privileged position.
Rachael Potter places Lewis’ post-war political writing within the group of English
reactionaries who saw period between 1914 and 1918 as the transition between “individual
liberalism” and “mass democracy” (5). She groups Lewis with Pound, Eliot, and H.D., as the
frontline of a literary reaction to a civil government whose purpose, they thought, was to sedate
the masses by providing for their material desires, instead of providing a legal framework
designed to protect the individual’s self-fulfillment through the pursuit of significant cultural
achievements. However, we must qualify Lewis’ resistance to mass democracy by clarifying that
it wasn’t the banal or uncultivated desires of the masses themselves that drew his contempt. In a
comprehensive study of his political thought, G. D. Bridson claims that Lewis’s goal was never
to disparage the masses for their lack of interest in high cultural pursuits. “Where some prefer to
study philosophy,” Bridson writes, “others prefer to cultivate their gardens…. [t]he
Roussophile’s wistful vision of ‘ballet every evening’ is hardly calculated to appeal to [the
masses]—nor did Lewis see any particular reason why it should” (56). The uneducated masses
will peruse, in Lewis’ estimation, what they desire to pursue, regardless of any judgment from
the refined and intellectualized remnant of British society. When taken into account next to
Lewis’ disgust with the bourgeoisies’ tendency towards mimesis, it almost appears as if he
admired the masses for an authenticity his social class could not achieve. And in the opening
pages of BLAST I he affirms the artist’s need for the uniquely savage authenticity found among
48

the uneducated masses: “WE NEED THE UNCONCIOUSNESS OF HUMANITY—their
stupidity, animalism and dreams” (8). This particular class contains a store of raw, vital material,
the primal “dreams” of the working class, who the artists find themselves obliged and privileged
to exploit.
Lewis took issue with mass democracy, then, not because it cultivated a mass idiocy he
abhorred. His problem with mass democracy was instead that it wasted the energy and attention
of government on the one thing that British society was guaranteed to do on its own. The
“unconsciousness of humanity” will seek what they desire. They don’t need anyone’s help for
that. This led Lewis, in The Art of Being Ruled, to ask a question that would set the tenor for his
political thought: “Instead of the vast organization to exploit the weaknesses of the Many, should
we not possess one for the exploitation of the intelligence of the Few?” (89). Governments
should focus their attention on the cultivation of an elite group of specialists. Their goal should
be to cultivate the scientific, artistic, philosophical and literary genius born within their borders,
defending them from the natural and expected hostility of the rest of society.
Even though he confesses a feeling at the end of The Art of Being Ruled that “no logical
future has taken pictorial shape” (413), Lewis does hint sporadically throughout that his vision
entails the rise of a “caste” of intellectual elites whose form would look something like the
synthesis of a modern “bureaucracy” and an ancient “priesthood” (156). As Bridson points out,
the question with which Lewis would always grapple was how this bureaucratic priesthood
would interact with the masses, and by extension, what kind of control they would have over
them. In Rude Assignment, Lewis speaks vaguely about the notion of “a separation, limited in
kind, between creative man and his backward fellow” (184). According to Bridson, this notion
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was “bristled with difficulties” (59) both logistically and ethically, so Lewis spoke rarely of it in
his political writings. However, our purpose here is to see if Tarr’s intimate portrait of the ideal
social elite can speak in place of Lewis’ refusal to elaborate on this relationship.
Tarr has the ability to speak in absence of Lewis' voice as a political commentator
because it its purpose is to, in short, place his ideal artist within the world of bourgeois absurdity
he wished to satirize. This allowed Lewis to simultaneously criticize the intricate follies of
bourgeois culture and to show what the artists’ attitude should be in relation to it. Tarr presents
its reader with an intense meditation on the relationship between art and life. Its pages contain an
elaborate network of ideas, spoken mainly through its titular hero, designed to delineate the
specifics of this relationship. Moreover, the story itself reflects a narrative symmetry that allows
a sort of economic stability to emerge between art and life. They are never completely
autonomous, and the novel’s characters, from Kreisler’s desperate attempt to return form art
back into life, to the absurdity of Tarr’s final half-triumph over both, are constantly transgressing
the boundaries between the two. As a result, we get a very specific preview of how Lewis’
"limited separation" (51 Bridson) between the artist and the rest of society actually works.
If Lewis contends that the artist should hold a privileged position over society, then we
must determine what kinds of ethical rights and responsibilities this privileged position implies.
To his credit, Lewis adamantly insists that the ascendancy of authentic artists to a privileged
position in culture ultimately benefits the culture as much or even more than it does the artist. In
exchange for an unnatural and lonely isolation, the artist, “more than the prophet or the religious
teacher” can “represent all that is unworldly in the world” (432 The Art of Being Ruled). This
representation, he claims, is neither nether mystical nor spiritual, but simply a purview of “the
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very stuff which all living (not mechanical) power is composed” (432 The Art of Being Ruled),
the virile energy of life. Such a representation saves the modern subject form slipping listlessly
back into the mechanized processes of modernity by reminding it that it is more than these
processes. To find out how the artist makes this discovery and the separation needed to do so, we
will first explore the relationship between art and life implied in the novel. Then, following
Kreisler from art “back into sex,” we will explore the novel’s satiric elements with the goal of
understanding how Lewis’ criticisms of bourgeois culture place them relationally within his ideal
social vision. Finally, we will use Tarr’s attitude towards that culture to form an understanding of
what, in Lewis’ thought, the entitlements and ethical obligations artist should hold in relation to
the rest society.
Possession and Indifference
Lewis builds Tarr’s conceptual framework on a sustained tension between two
competing attitudes he calls "possession" and "indifference." The novel’s artistic “psudo-couple”
(37 Jameson),16 Tarr and Kreisler, find themselves faced with the dilemma of trying to live
consciously as artists in the world by understanding the relationship between possession and
indifference—which presents itself in the novel as their attempt to relate their sexual desires to
their ambition as artists. Sexual experience, in Tarr, reads something similar to Bataille’s notion
of a “return to continuity.” In Bataille’s analysis of sexual experience, an organism focuses so

16

In Fables of Aggression, Jameson claims that “the very element of Lewis’ novelistic world” presents itself as a
“violent stichomythia” between to advisories of “matched and abrasive consciousnesses” (37), which he calls the
pseudo-couple, a paring based not on sympathy or identification, but competition for dominance. Thus, Jameson
argues that Lewis “saw the privileged role” in this agon as “the essentially nonsocial one of artist or pure eye…
longing for world stilled of the conflicts of the political and of political parties, conceived [by] some ultimate vision
of the peace of divine and angelic indifference” (37).
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much of its conscious energy on the stimulation that a particular set of sensations provide that
reflexive self-awareness is reduced to a pre-conscious unity. This results in the “discontinuous
self” experiencing a return to a singular “continuous” state of semiconscious unity. The term
“discontinuous self,” for Bataille, represents the ego able to distinguish itself from the physical
body it inhabits. It is the conscious state that can point to its hand and say, for example, “this is
not me, it is my hand, a part of me,” a self alienated from its own being. Conversely, the “return
to continuity,” the return to thingness experienced through extreme pain or extreme sexual
sensation, represents the momentary obliteration of this alienating ego. In such a state, reflection
becomes impossible.17
The obsessive focus sex entails, thus, presents a threat to artists, who, in Lewis’
estimation, must remain highly conscious of their experiences to render them artistically. Tarr
breaks his engagement with Bertha when he determines that his attachment to her threatens his
ambition as an artist. Love, Tarr realizes “is either possession or a possessive madness … the
obsession of a personality” (72), “Possession,” then, as the subject of Tarr’s mistrust, represents
the full and unremitting contact with the most virile forms of conscious experience at the
expense of complete self-awareness. It is possession in a double sense— as the subject possesses
the object of its desire and, in turn, the object effects emotional and sensual responses so
powerful that it conversely takes possession of the apprehending subject. This possession
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Bataille Writes: “The transition form the normal state to that of erotic desire presupposes a partial dissolution of
the person as he exists in the realm of discontinuity… In the process of dissolution [of discontinuous consciousness]
the male generally has an active role, while the female partner is passive. The passive female side is essentially one
that is dissolved into a separate entity. But for the male partner the dissolution of the passive partner means one
thing only: it is paving the way for a fusion where both are mingled., attaining at length the same degree of
dissolution. The whole business of eroticism is to destroy the self-contained character of the participators as they are
in their normal lives” (17 Erotism italics mine).
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muddles the clarity of Tarr’s focus, provoking in him the fear that the self-satisfying pleasure of
Bertha’s sex could hold his artistic insight in arrest.
Lewis thus posits Kreisler as Tarr’s double. Not as Tarr’s direct opposite, that which
opposes art, but instead a portrait of the dangers of possession to the artist. We see the
semiconscious arrest Tarr fears directly embodied in “the unconscious” (191) Kreisler’s
obsession to “possess” the novel’s female protagonists, Bertha Lunken and Anastasya Vasek.
“Kreisler’s one great optimism,” Lewis tells us, “was a belief in the efficacy of women” (101).
Women, for Kreisler, represent “a vast dumping ground for sorrow and affliction—a world
dimensioned Pawn-shop, in which you could deposit not your dress suit or garments, but
yourself, temporarily, in exchange for the gold of the human heart” (101 italics mine). This
metaphor ironically capitalizes on Kreisler’s financial trouble (he has to get his dress “frac” out
of pawn so he can attend the dance party where he intends to seduce Anastasya), to create a
sense of continuity between his persistent financial woes and his failings as an artist. Kreisler has
an unmistakably sentimental and escapist attitude towards sex. The emotions and sensations of
the sex act, “the gold of the human heart,” represent a fleeting but singular resolution to the
antipathy of modern life. Thus, sex represents a means by which he can be “purged…
periodically of the too violent accumulations of to desperate life” (102), by a retreat from selfawareness into the overwhelming swell of subjective experience.
The novel itself, however, becomes a sort of catalogue of this attitude’s ultimate
inadequacy. Kreisler’s escapist use of sex fails because it presents a fleeting and illusory
distortion of the reality of “indifference.” In Tarr, the state of indifference simultaneously refers
to a conscious state, the trademark of a true artist’s temperament, and an objective reality. Thus,
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both Tarr and Kreisler at different moments “enjoy” their “feeling of indifference” (49) and, at
the same time, Lewis can assign to the world of the novel itself “an enormous indifference and
ignorance flowing all round” (196). The artist’s feeling of indifference looks something like
Argol’s revelation in “Enemy of the Stars” that “Men have a loathsome deformity called self”
(71) which allows their solipsistic desires to delude their view of a word they naively think
responds to those desires in either benevolent fulfillment or cruel withdrawal. Thus Argol finds
that to be an artist means to “spoil [the] continuity of instinctive behavior” (74) by
acknowledging objects in the world as they are, apart form the illusory emotions that subjective
desire attaches to them. Tarr’s world is one where artists apprehend reality by drawing up the
thrall experience out of subjective consciousness. Object’s are seen in-themselves when the
artist’s consciousness removes them from the currents of social convention and “personal” desire
(this word, of course, always presenting a misnomer in Lewis’ thought when used in relation to
the bourgeoisie).
Thus, the “weakness” of Kreisler’s frustrated sexuality perpetually draws him “back into
the vortex” of subjective experience. To capitalize on the metaphor of a vortex, Lewis presents
Kreisler as an inauthentic artist because he always inhabits the center of his vortex. He finds
himself so focused on the virile energy of his own desire that he is unaware, unlike the authentic
artist Tarr, of how life moves around him. Lewis shows us that this self-absorption presents a
deadly (literally suicidal) narcissism from which the subject cannot recover. At the
semiconscious center of his experience, Kreisler forms a pariah complex, thinking that the
external world is not indifferent but malicious. This leads to his erratic behavior at the dance
party, his challenge to and subsequent killing of Soltyk, and his suicide. Kreisler dies because he
mistakes his chimerical and time-bound emotional life for the world it represents. He determines,
54

in another comic metaphor capitalizing on his money problems, that he and the universe have
some sort of personal commerce, and that it has doomed him to die because their accounts are
“settled” (164).
Tarr, however, realizes that his own indifference can facilitate a real aesthetic connection
with the external world. At the end of the novel, he comes to the conclusion that art is “life with
all the nonsense taken out of it” (298)—that it “is identical with the idea of the person …
continuity and not an individual spasm” (299). This is because artists, in Tarr’s estimation, “only
see what is necessary to the eye,” they “specialize in necessities” (298). Here, the Novel divorces
“necessity” from its usual references— notions of physical substance or a binding logical
relationship. Instead, Lewis’ artist looks for that which presents itself necessary in an ontological
sense, finding it, as Tarr says, in “a hippopotamus’ armoured [sic] hide. A turtle’s shell, feathers
or machinery … that opposed to its naked pulsing and moving of the soft inside of life” (299).
He searches for the “soul” of a thing, which he finds in the “lines and masses,” only the things
that the artist finds absolutely necessary for representing it. Only these lines and masses can save
life from the “restless, quick flame-like ego” (300) of subjective experience.
Because he can make these distinctions, Tarr holds the place of true artist at the novel’s
end. Unlike Kreisler, who uses sex “to get out of Art back into Life again” (302), he realizes that
the artist should expose himself to only those virile and naked moments of subjective experience
necessary to understand the “lines and masses” of its soul. The artist must find his material in
“the crude and unformed bed, the stupidity and formlessness” (236) necessary to understand life.
Thus, “the birth of a work of art is as dirty as that of a baby” (236). Art depends on sex, but the
artists’ attitude towards subjective experience successfully engenders the creative act.
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“From Art into Sex”
Relocating possession and indifference from individual consciousness to a wider social
dynamic shows us that, within Tarr, the tension between subjective experience and selfreflection also determine the distinctions Lewis attempt to reinstate through his satirical attack on
the bourgeoisie. In The Art of Being Ruled, Lewis argues that the corrosion of stable social order
arises in response to “a certain type of energy” that “constantly carries men up into the ruling
class” (155). An expanding ruling class did not present a problem in itself. More precisely, Lewis
saw a problem with the sort of people who make their way to the top of a capitalist society: “a
collection of personalities with no traditions, no intellectual training except such as is involved in
speculation in stocks … no religious beliefs or any attachments to a wider system than that of the
stock market” (155). This rootless and shallow group of social upstarts are Lewis’ bourgeoisie—
a rapacious band of semiconscious consumers who use Europe’s newly emerging commodity
industry to fabricate a sense of genuine culture.
Lewis deftly captures this shallow attempt to fabricate a culture and tradition through
Tarr’s repeated disgust with Bertha’s art deco domestic sensibilities, or what Lewis calls her
“Bourgeois-Bohemian interior” (52). Bertha adorns her apartment with the feeble accoutrements
of mass-production:
Green silk cloth and cushions of various vegetable and mineral shades
covered everything, in mildewy [sic] blight. The cold, repulsive shades of
islands of the dead, gigantic cypresses, grottos of teutonic nymphs, had
invaded the dwelling. Purple metal and leather steadily dispensed with
expensive objects. There was the plaster cast of Beethoven (some people who
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have frequented artistic circles get to dislike this face extremely), brass jars
from Normandy, a photograph of Mona Lisa (Tarr hated the Mona Lisa). (52)
Much like his satirical paintings in the nineteen thirties (for example, his “Portrait of T.S. Eliot”),
Lewis drapes Bertha’s room in the decedent eclecticism of Europe’s post-imperial fascination
with the East, “the green silk cloth” and “various vegetable and mineral shades.” These appear
randomly juxtaposed with plastic replications of the achievements Western art, the several
“islands of the dead” and “grottoes of teutonic nymphs.” (Ironically, Lewis only a few
paragraphs earlier describes Bertha as striking a “Dryad like” (52) pose, suggesting in light of
her home decor that she has reduced her own sexuality to a consumable object). This
juxtaposition suggests the corrosion of stable systems of aesthetic judgment. Art as a commodity,
divorced from its historical and factual origins in a mass cultural phenomenon that resembles
Bourdieu’s idea of “genesis amnesia,”18 threatens to level the distinctions between the significant
cultural accomplishments of the past and the machine-like frenzy of the present. The members of
the bourgeoisie disregard the relative strengths and weaknesses of past cultural accomplishment,
so that the violent struggles of past artistic innovators against their time become ridiculously
accessible without genuine appreciation of their origins. Lewis ends this passage with a subtle
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In his Outline of a Theory of Practice, Bourdieu defines genesis amnesia as the result of “the objectivist
apprehension, which, grabbing the product of history as an opus operatum… can only invoke the mysteries of preestablished harmony or the prodigies of conscious orchestration to account for what, apprehended in pure
synchrony, appears as objective meaning” (79). Essentially, genesis amnesia is the phenomenon of mass forgetting,
where the violence and trauma of class conflict does not account for the subject’s apprehension of their social world,
but the subject assumes falsely that “things are as they always have been.” Richard Terdiman suggests that this
effect can be tied back to the commodity industry when he writes that “in the modern period appears to reside not in
perceiving consciousnesses but in the material: in the practices and institutions of social or psychic life, which
function within us, but do nit seem to require either or participation or our allegiance” (34). From this assertion, we
can see how the overwhelming mnemonic effect of perceiving the mass-produced simulacra of a single object over
and over again could mystify its actual historical origins.
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hint at the result of this phenomenon: those who “have frequent artistic circles” in Tarr’s Paris
“can get to dislike” Beethoven’s face. The bourgeois temperament becomes so affected by the
leveling power of commodity culture that the great achievements of German romanticism can be
dismissed over the dislike of Beethoven’s brooding scowl.
The odd thing about this scene, however, is that Tarr retreats from Berth’s gross art deco
by occupying himself with a commodity-producing device. Turning from Bertha’s plastic home
museum, Tarr “manufactures” cigarettes with “a little steel machine” (53) he keeps in his pocket.
Paul O’keeffe notes that the schematics of this particular device greatly resemble GaudierBrzeska’s bronze sculpture “torpedo Fish” (n.4 333). Also, Paul Edwards notes that Tarr twice
tries to convince his acquaintances to give up art and “develop an interest in commerce” (36
Tarr),19 like his failed attempt to convince Hobson to quit Paris and take a banking job in South
Africa, or Butcher, whom Tarr has convinced to renounce art in exchange for success as a car
salesman. We cannot simply write Lewis off as a Luddite. In BLAST I, Lewis blasts
“ROUSSEAUISMS” and “wild nature cranks” (13) and later blesses “monotonous cranes,” the
“heavy chaos of wharves,” and the “steep walls of factories” (23). He does not appear to be
resistant to the machinery of the industrialized world. Even though he might not find himself
willing to give art over to the laudation of industrial machines like his Futurist competitors,
Lewis at least appears to think the technology of mass production a worthy site of aesthetic
exploration.

19

Edwards argues that Tarr encourages his friends to take up commerce because “the tendency of the novel as a
whole is to stress the degree to which Bohemia is not so much an alternative to bourgeois society as an extension of
it” (31). Thus we can see Tarr’s apparent affinity for commercial culture not as an endorsement of the culture itself,
but as a reaffirmation of artistic authenticity. Tarr’s career advice to his friends act as a protection of the validity of
his artistic project by replacing inauthentic artists in the social strata in which they belong.
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To understand how Lewis could simultaneously value modern industry and find himself
repulsed with its effect on the middle-class, we must locate an image of Tarr’s world with a
wider historical scope than the comfortable immediacy of Bertha Lunknen’s apartment. Jameson
notes how Lewis’ machine like syntax gives his extended scene descriptions the ability to both
render accurately a specific location and reflect the whole process of mechanized society.20 We
see this kind of performance in Tarr when Lewis describes the edacious rise of the café Lejeune,
which:
… [L]ike many others in Paris, had been originally a clean, tranquil
little creamery … then one customer after another had become more
gluttonous. He had asked, in addition to his daily glass of milk, for beefsteak
and spinach, or some terrific nourishment, which the decent little business first
supplied with timid protest. But perpetual scenes of sanguine voracity— weeks
of compliance with the most brutal and unbridled appetites of man—gradually
brought about a change in its character. It became frankly a place where the
most carnivorous palate might be palled. As trade grew, the small business had
burrowed backwards into the house—the victorious flood of commerce had
burst through walls and partitions, flung down doors, discovered many dingy
rooms in the interior it instantly filled with serried cohorts of eaters. It had
driven out terrified families … and in the musty bowels of the house it had
established a … roaring den, inhabited by a rushing and howling band of
slatternly savages. (97)
20

For my explanation of this phenomenon in Lewis’ fiction, see page 12 of the introduction, and for Jameson’s
explanation found in Fables of Aggression see n. 5.
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In this violent portrait of the café’s expansion, Lewis offers a vision of industrial society’s rise.
This presents a direct indictment of bourgeois culture in the formation of the modern condition.
The bizarre impersonality of the acting agents in the passage—the café itself reacts to the
“carnivorous palate” and the “unbridled apatite of “cohorts of eaters”— suggests that industrial
society rose as a result of mass desire. According to Lewis, the bourgeoisies’ sudden rise to
prominence, coupled with their rootless lack of discipline—its “sanguine voracity,” has
necessitated commodity culture in response to it collective desire. Here, Lewis meets the hard-atwork banker or industrious steel mogul with a terse but ultimately approving nod. It is the
dilettante that provokes his wrath, the officious upstarts that convert their newly acquired wealth
and free-time into their own machine-made faux culture. The machine-like quality of modern life
has not robbed Europe of its individuals. The loss of individuality through mimetic desire has
forced the machine into existence. The “victorious flood of commerce” with its “roaring den”
and its “slatternly savages” presents itself as the result of mimetic desire, not the cause.
Lewis renders the end result of industrialization through Kreisler's flirtatious attempt to
give Anystasa a "lesson" (98) on how to order from the café Lejune:
'Allow me to give you some idea of what the menu of the restaurant is
like... at the head of each list you will find simple dishes, elemental dishes...
this is the rough material from which the others are evolved. Each list is like an
oriental dance, it gets wilder as it goes along. In the last dish you can be sure
that potatoes will taste like tomatoes, and the pork like a sirloin of beef.' (98)
In this passage, Lewis gives us a distilled image of Western Europe's progression from
provinciality, the "simple... elemental dishes" to decadence. Like in his description of Bertha's
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apartment, Lewis again capitalizes on a dubious association between Eastern culture and a lack
of discipline: the café's dishes are like "an oriental dance" getting "wilder" as they progress.
Complexity, however, is not the issue. Lewis does not want to advocate nostalgia for provincial
culture. In the last sentence, his subtle but effective use of the word "taste"— operating
surreptitiously in the future tense— reveals a distain for an apparent lack of urbanity or
refinement in what Lewis' contemporaries might think of as high culture. “Taste,” as a means of
judging the aesthetic merits of artwork, becomes a misnomer. The bourgeoisie usurps the clearthinking refinement of a cultivated aesthetic plate and replaces it with an artificial apatite that
conceals its artificiality by conflating the distinction between art as an authentic endeavor and
the mass produced commodity. Thus the values an individual develops to establish in relation to
the rest of their culture becomes conflated: "the potatoes will taste like tomatoes, and the pork
like a sirloin of beef."
This conflation of taste, the inability to distinguish personal values from mass trends,
results in what Lewis calls in The Art of Being Ruled the "vulgarization of disgust," which
manifests as "the natural insolence and desire for a feeling of superiority in those who are
superior in nothing but money and the power it gives" (85). Individuality dissolves at this point.
Bourgeois society transforms the development of a capable sense of aesthetic judgment into a
matter of responding to appetite. Appetite, the desires of what Lewis would call the "wild body,"
respond to a herd instinct. As a result, the bourgeoisie develop only a semiconscious sense of
their own individuality— they are conscious of themselves as individuals per se but are
simultaneously ignorant of the fact that their sense of individuality finds itself engendered
though a class trend.
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As a social satire, Tarr seeks to faithfully represent the hypocrisy and absurdity of this
faux sense of individuality. In the novel, Lewis conveniently designates his satirical targets the
"Bourgeois Bohemians," capturing their hypocrisy in the idea that they present a class of people
with enough wealth and social standing to buy their way into the Paris art scene and appear to
live anti-materialistic lives dedicated to art. Lewis developed a special method for the fictional
rendering of these people that he would later deem in Men Without Art (1934) "metaphysical
satire." Within this system, the satirist devotes his energy to "the outside of people" so that "their
shells or pelts, or the language of their body movements, come first" (118). The satirist must
ignore interiority, viewing people with the "objective, non-emotional truth of scientific
intelligence" (121). Unlike moral satire, which criticizes people by emphasizing the disparity
between their professed intentions and their actions, metaphysical satire collapses both into a
single continuity of external appearance. The satirist's attack shows people as they are, without
showing any potential interior site of moral redemption through a change in character. Thus,
Lewis deems his satire distinctly "non-moral" (104).
In Tarr, Lewis denies the "Bourgeois Bohemians" interiority by feminizing them. In
much of his fiction, Lewis places the individual and the crowd in a gender binary. For example,
in a short story published in BLAST II "The Crowd Master," Lewis writes that "the married man
is the symbol of the crowd ... at the altar he embraces death" (94). When we take into
consideration that Lewis' crowd is only semiconscious, the above image of the masculine
husband embracing his own negation implies that the crowd presents a feminized receptacle for
the loss of the individual's conciseness. The crowd is feminine to the true individual. In The Art
of Being Ruled, Lewis insists that this gender dynamic has nothing to do with actual biological
sex. However, there does exist places in Lewis' fiction where the femininity of the crowd appears
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linked to physical sex, like the "Code of a Herdsmen" printed in BLAST II when he claims that
the artist should "treat" women "kindly, for they suffer from the herd," while at the same time he
warns that they are "of" (79) the heard as well.
We see this dynamic relationship between femininity and the herd instinct enacted in the
"Bourgeois Bohemians'" feminine caucus after Kreisler's disastrous intrusion on the dance party.
Here, these women (and one man) are reacting to Kreisler's behavior: "When one is attacked,"
Fräulein Lipmann says, "one doesn't spend time contemplating why one is attacked, but in
defending oneself" (173 italics his). Lipmann's delicate and urbane substitution of the ambiguous
"one" for the definite first person pronoun, coupled with her frank demand that the ladies avoid
reflecting on the incident, implies a denial of self-assertion in favor of instinctual reaction. The
crowd acts only in a defensive posture against the individual, and thus he (in this instance
Kreisler) controls their movements. Lewis mirrors this reactive posture in the way he represents
the ladies' deliberation. Usually a glutton for accentuating physical detail, Lewis navigates this
scene through the selective isolation of disembodied physical organs and voices. Thus, he gives
us the pack leader Lippmann as a pair of "eyes fixed on a tram near by," later manifesting as,
"lips a little white with fatigue," and "shoulders with blank contemptuous indifference" (173).
Voices other than Lipmann's manifest anonymously and without a definite location. The man in
the group, Ekhart, provides a comically impotent parody of bourgeois chivalry by "moving
rhythmically in his chair something like a steady rising sea" (173), his anger invoking a
disastrously inappropriate simile implying a sort of picturesque tranquility. His self-assertion
fails when the women silence him, insisting that revenge on Kreisler is "one of the occasions for
a woman" (174).
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This passage provides us with a good example of Lewis' satirical technique because, on
the level of representation, it reflects many of his aesthetic concerns: a tension between form and
chaos, fragmentation and wholeness, stasis and flux. The axis on which these ideas find
themselves centered, however, is Lewis' critique of the "Bourgeois Bohemians." As the
semiconscious class, these bourgeoisies can reflect on their own individuality, but are unaware
that they define this individuality through a channel of mass desire. In the passage cited above,
Lipmann's eyes, lips, and shoulders present fragments of an incomplete individual body, but
since the group, as a body, is made of fragments, their isolation is the expression of an altogether
other whole. The darkness out of which the ladies’ disembodied voices come transforms into the
surface that Lewis wants to represent. As individuals, the ladies are mere fragments, but they
find themselves completed through Lewis' reinvention of their bodies and voices as a single
surface. For Lewis, satire as a conversion of interior flux to surface re-invests a society of
fragmented individuals with a sense of aesthetic completeness of which they have robbed
themselves. Thus, Lewis' satire works as both social critique and an objective reconstruction of a
fragmented bourgeois society.

Swearing off Humor
In a letter dated September of 1918, T. Sturge Moore told Lewis, after commending him
for the accomplishment of his first novel, that he wished Fredric Tarr had been "more frankly
you, or something more wholly distinct from his creator" (99). Lewis was unsure about Tarr's
autobiographical implications as well. In his preface, he gives Tarr a "private and independent
life of his own" of which he "would be very sorry to be held responsible" (15). Lewis, however,
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undercuts his own attempt to distance himself from his protagonist. In a move that affirms
Moore's accusation, Lewis' preface identifies for the reader distinct traces of his own thought in
Fredric Tarr, admitting that he "associates [himself] with everything [Tarr] says on the subject of
humour" (15). In the novel, Tarr's pledge to "swear off humor" because it "paralyzes the sense
for reality" (43) trapping people "in a phlegmatic and hysterical dream-world" represents the
artist's constant diligence against the slothful trappings of bourgeois subjectivity. Tarr's constant
diligence against the trappings of humor thus presents the conscious habit of the ideal artist.
Resistance to "humor" gives Tarr the ability to operate apart from the masses while at the same
time immersing himself in life through sexual experience.
Tarr's own talk about humor ranges to the point that it requires a basis of comparison. As
a satirist, Lewis himself employs humor, and he takes care in Men Without Art to distinguish his
use of humor from that of the bourgeoisie by indentifying the perils of laughter:
Laughter, humor and wit—has a function in relation to our tender
consciousnesses; a function similar to of art. It is the preserver much more than
the destroyer. And, in a sense, everyone should be laughed at or no one should
be laughed at. It seems ultimately that is the alternative. (109)
Laughter that is not directed to the universal plight of humanity functions ultimately as a
means of differing introspection. Lewis claims that “the laugh alone possesses the power
of magnification” (109). The danger of laughter, then, presents itself as the subject’s
ability to use laughter to magnify the absurdity of another, thus conversely shielding itself
from the laugh’s power to reveal its own absurdity. In the preface to Tarr, Lewis’ token
example for this deferral is “the worship (or craze, we call it) of Charlie Chaplin” which
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he calls a “mad substitution” for reality (15), the laugh directed at another, designed to
conceal the fundamental hilarity of the self.
We can compare Lewis’ insistence on the detrimental effects of evasive humor to
Lacan’s notion of misrecognition. Lacan's commentary on the role of jokes in maintaining the
chimerical "unity of the subject" (673) offers us a stable means through which we can read Tarr's
musing on the "curse of humour" (243) among the English bourgeoisie:
Hence the place of the "inner-said" [inter-dit], constituted by the "intrasaid" [intra-dit] of a between-two-subjects, is the vary place at which the
transparency of the classical subject divides, undergoing, as it does, the effects
of fading that specify the Freudian subject due to its occultation as an even
purer signifier; may these effects lead us to the frontiers where slips of the
tongue and jokes become indistinguishable in their collusion ... that we are
astonished the hunt for Dasein hasn't made any more of it. (678 Écrits)
Here, Lacan suggests that the act of joking presents the subject's desperate attempt to evade the
kind of self-realization possible through the "intra said" of consciousness' turning in on itself.
Joking functions as the ego's attempt to maintain continuity in the subject threatened by the
introspection psychoanalysis demands. This bears a striking resemblance to Tarr's understanding
of the purpose of "humour" within English society:
'With the training you get in England, how can you be expected to
realize anything? The University of Humour that prevails everywhere in
England as the national institution for developing youth, provides you with
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nothing but a first rate means of evading reality... Many of the results are
excellent; it saves us from gush in so many cases; it is an excellent armour [sic]
in times of crisis or misfortune ... but for the sake of this wonderful panacea—
English Humor— we sacrifice much. It would be better to face our imagination
and our nerves without this soporific.' (42)
Humor, For Lewis, works as a "first rate means of evading reality" at the cost of an honest
confrontation between the subject and its "imagination" and "nerves." Both these passages
implicate humor as a means of evading self-reflection. There remains, however, the question of
whether or not Tarr, like Lacan's notion of the subversion of the subject, implies a model of
consciousness that challenges the notion of the subject as a unified whole.
If, for Lewis, the unified self emerges from the evasive laughter directed towards another,
then this conception of self is not authentic. The alternative mode of consciousness then presents
itself as the subject turning in to laugh at itself through satirical objectification. Thus, we can
infer that, for Lewis, authentic consciousness manifests through the act of self-distancing
laughter. The authentic self is the act of self-distancing. We see Tarr effect his self distancing in
the beginning of the novel, where a conversation with Hobson inspires him to examine his
relationship with Bertha. Commenting on his attitude to sex, Tarr says “I laugh hoarsely through
the thickness… People will begin to think that I am an alligator if they see me always swimming
in their daily ooze. As far as sex is concerned, I am that” (27). In this self-deprecating image,
Tarr maintains his elitist snobbery towards the rest of humanity, presenting himself as the
indifferent thick skin of the alligator wallowing in the weak-minded messiness of human sexual
relations. However, his image implicitly mocks his own self-importance, creating a necessary
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distance between and the role he sees himself occupying in the world and his conscious
awareness of that role.
How then, does Lewis formulate the artistic consciousness in a way that ensures its
perpetual self-distancing? I argue that Lewis formulates his theory of artistic consciousness in an
attempt to conjoin that which Alain Badiou calls “the anti-dialectics of … primordial duality,”
the “choice between formalization and destruction” which the artist can only resolve “by means
of formalization” (110 italics his). Within the context of early modernist literary theory, this
would look something like the radical juxtaposition of the Arnoldian and Paterian aesthetic
doctrines, where the vitality and force of the Paterian sentence can be preserved by rigid
formalization through the Arnoldian attitude of disinterestedness.21 I contend that Lewis insisted
on this juxtaposition of seemingly contradictory aesthetic doctrines as a result of his relationship
with the philosophy of Henri Bergson. In his most important non-fiction work of literature, Time
and Western Man (1927), Lewis implicates Bergson’s “time obsessed flux” with the founding of
“a sort of mystical time-cult” which he claims has “gained an undisputed ascendency in the
modern world” (xv) since the end of the 19th century. This “time-cult” threatens the clarity of
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In the conclusion of The Renaissance, Walter Pater writes, “To such a tremulous wisp constantly re-forming itself
on the stream, to a single sharp impression, with a sense in it, a relic more or less fleeting, of such moments gone by,
what is real in our life finds itself down. It is with this movement, with the passage and dissolution of impressions,
images, sensations, that analysis leaves off—that continual vanishing away, that strange, perpetual weaving and
unweaving of ourselves” (236). Compare this to Arnold’s aerations in Culture and Anarchy. In the first essay of
Culture and Anarchy, Arnold defines culture as the pursuit of “perfection,” emerging from “thorough disinterested
study of human nature and human experiences… a harmonious expansion of all the powers which make the beauty
and worth of human nature” (62), later defining disinterestedness as “the active use of reading, reflection, and
observation. Pater calls for an aesthetic embrace of the impression, the impulse, the isolated and subjective moment
of experience, whereas Arnold demands constant introspection and learned contextualizing. We can see Lewis
trying to impart both these qualities in Tarr in the idea of “swagger sex” (311), the artist’s self-conscious
performance of impulsive virility that renders sexual experience as a formalized art object.
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form in art by exalting the “subjective impulses of history and biography” over the “concrete”
(xv-xvi) world of formal purity.
However, in spite of his resistance to the Bergsonian notion of “dure,” Tarr displays
Lewis’ debt to the Bergsonian model of consciousness. In Bergsonain philosophy, the creative or
inventive impulse arises from the dynamic tension of two conscious faculties. “Instinct
perfected,” Bergson writes, “is a faculty of using and even constructing organized instruments,”
whereas, “intelligence perfected is the faculty of making and using unorganized instruments” (83
italics his). The difference between these two faculties lies in the fact that instinct deals primarily
with satisfying a desire in the organism, by reorganizing the external word into tools that make
this desire attainable. Thus, “the instrument forms a part of a body that uses it” (82), and the
organism cannot with instinct see that which it reorganizes as anything as an extension of its
physical desire. Intelligence, however, “consists in an inflection of past experience in the
direction of present experience” where the organism “tends toward an ideal” (81). Intelligence
abstracts desire by removing it from the context of its arising and projecting its formal qualities
onto a different situation. This, Bergson contends, “is the beginning of invention” (81). Creation
presents itself as the act of abstracting the organized means by which a desire is obtained.
Above all, Bergson emphasizes the dependence of the creative impulse on the dynamic tension
between these two faculties. The intellect depends on instinct to “comprehend life” (88) and the
instinct knows nothing outside of the present moment without the abstracting capability of the
intellect.
From this, we can understand more clearly what Tarr means when he styles himself an
“Efficient Chimpanzee” (303 italics his). His almost inhuman insight into the world of forms
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stems not from a Rousseauian poeticizing of “wild nature” or putting it forth “as an ideal” (236).
Instead, Tarr takes his insights from “expediency” (236) letting his instinctual need for sex (the
impulses of the “Wild Body”) operate through him, unhindered by any conscious attempt to
aestheticize it. Paradoxically, this surrender to sex allows his intellect to see the world more
clearly when engaging it artistically. Here, Tarr successes seem to approach something like
Nietzsche’s valorization of the “life affirming instinct," in that Tarr resists the temptation to flee
from or disguise his sensual urges by making them something their not, namely something
beatified. Instead, he accepts the formless chaos that they are, so that the duality between life and
art can remain distinct while still allowing these separate spheres to interact. Thus, after his first
night with Anastasya, Tarr announces himself “the new animal,” whose ability “will succeed the
superman” (307) in its life-affirming abilities.
That Lewis basis his model of consciousness in Tarr from a system like Bergson's, where
the act of creation rises as a result of the dynamic tension between two opposing forces, implies a
possible challenge to the idea of a unified subject. During Tarr's first meeting with Bertha, Lewis
gives us an image, a metaphorical comparison of Tarr and Betha's interiors, that suggests that the
subject's constant subversion and dislocation lies at the center of the artist's emergence into and
dominance over the world:
A woman has in the middle of her a kernel, a sort of very substantial
astral baby. This baby was apt to swell. She [Bertha] then became all baby. He
[Tarr] was a mummy case, too. Only he contained nothing but innumerable
other panted cases inside, smaller and smaller ones. The smallest was not a
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substantial astral baby, or live core, but a painting like the rest. = His kernel
was a painting. That was as it should be! (58-59)
At the center of Bertha's self, Tarr sees an image that easily reminds us of Lacan's notion of the
Real, the proto-lingual state of being that, after the subject finds itself structured through
language, leaves that subject "a prisoner in the toils of the pleasure principal," something
"primary" and "determinate in the function of repetition" (55-60 "Four Fundamental Concepts").
From a Lacanian Point of view, we can take Lewis' metaphor of Bertha as a baby quite literally.
Behind the veil of Bertha's subjectivity lies the irrational dependency of a crying child, unable to
actualize fully her independence from the pre-oedipal desire for the comfort of Tarr's
consistency. Tarr, on the other hand, presents a quite different image. At his own core, Tarr sees
himself as a mise en abyme. The center of his being presents an image of itself, which in turn
presents an image of itself— and so forth. Each attempt to represent the core of his being
operates self-reflexively. Each representation represents a representation, which is
simultaneously a representation of itself in kind (they are all paintings) and in particular a
representation of something else entirely (we are led to assume they are all different pictures).
In this image, the subject, Tarr's experience of being-in-the-world, fragments and looks
back on itself in a transference that makes subjective experience an object for the self to
contemplate. However, as the myse en abyme suggests, this self presents just another
representation of self already objectified. Lacan, in developing a therapy of subject-subversion,
claims that this kind of constant objectification of subjective experience provides a way of
dismantling an ego which "masks it duplicity... in which the ego assures itself as an indisputable
existence" (685 Écrits) through the creation of an ego-ideal. The problem with this ideal-ego for
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Lacan is that it presents a fundamental misrecognition by acknowledging the self through the
alienating mirror of the other, and then appropriating this mirror image as its own ego ideal. We
can easily apply it to Lewis' critique of bourgeois desire. The bourgeois subjectivity realizes its
individuality by unconsciously adopting the desires of its class and then touting them as its own.
Thus, the bourgeoisie fail to create an authentic sense of individuality by accepting their
subjective experience as reality. This, for Lewis, is the disastrous failure of humor— the inability
to differentiate between their "phlegmatic and hysterical dream-world" and the real world.
In the language of its historical context, the artist's consciousness avoids the trappings of
subjectivity by constantly objectifying instinct at the moment it arises, transforming it into a
solid surface with the "objective, non-emotional truth of scientific intelligence." Metaphysical
satire, then, functions not as a mere artistic technique but as a mode of consciousness. Tarr
himself commits the look at the world "inhumanly" (43), thus perpetually effecting the turn from
subjective interior to objective surface Lewis promises in his preface: "If you look closely at my
grin you will perceive that it is a very logical and deliberate grimace" (15). In the satirist’s eye,
the ephemeral gush of emotion of a grin becomes the repulsion of the oppositional grimace. To
the artist, the depths of subjective experience— sexual desire, hatred, sympathy— present a
glaring surface of absurd falsity. The artist takes these experiences, and through a paradoxical
transformation, asserts his individuality by taking an antagonistic stance to them. He (Lewis
would demand the masculine pronoun) makes the world around him his own by opposing himself
to it. This presents us with, playing on the ambiguity of Lewis' syntax, the idea of "conscience as
an artist." The artist, in Lewis' social vision, receives an ethical license to objectify those
subjective impulses around which the currents of social relations are structure within a society—
to re-appropriate subjective experience as the lines and masses of art.
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Our reading of Tarr reveals several critical implications concerning Lewis' ideal artist—
especially concerning his idea of "limited separation" between the artist and the masses. The best
satire, in Lewis' estimation, is "non-moral," but then what does the purpose of satire present itself
as? What function would the artist ultimately have in Lewis' ideal society? To answer these
questions, we must turn from the world Lewis presents us in Tarr to a look at his relationship
with it. As author, Lewis’ creation of the self-as-self-distancing in Tarr forms a dialectical move
from antagonist, to protagonist, to author. Kreisler presents the inauthentic vortex, an on-rush of
virile energy that prevents self-deferral. He is sex without art. Tarr, however, attempts selfdistancing but finds himself trapped at the end of the novel in “a moral tale told on behalf of
Bertha” (305), admitting through his marriage and claiming Kreisler’s child as his that he is
somehow dependent on Bertha. His final position within the novel is an absurd one, and he is
forced to oscillate back and forth between sex and art, between Bertha and Anastasya, Rose
Fawcett and Prism Dirkes. His final solution for mitigating art and sex itself becomes a kind of
dependency on the other, a weakness. If Kreisler is the negation of artistic consciousness
presenting itself as the true artist, Tarr, then, is the artistic consciousness only half-formed but
still unable to effect complete self-distancing. The final step in Tarr’s dialectical move towards
the authentic artist would be Lewis himself. Thus we see the hierarchical relation between the
artist and the masses emerge through the artist negating his subject, the refusing of identification
that makes up sympathetic understanding.
We must, however, avoid labeling Lewis’ refusal to sympathize as a self-satisfied
egoism. His ironic re-posturing of his own authorial position in Tarr is not self-affirmation in a
normal sense. Lewis does not complete his dialectic by refusing others, but by refusing his own
feelings for them as an essentially narcissistic subjective experience. He denies not others, but
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him self. Artists’ triumph over the world, then, presents itself as a triumph over self, through the
masochism of objectification, distance and alienation from the self’s own feelings and desires as
punishment for receiving the mantle of artistic insight.
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Chapter 3— “Some picture that I have seen somewhere:”
History and the Great Figure in Ford’s The Good Soldier
If, therefore, Individuality is erroneously supposed to be rooted in the
particularity of nature and character, then in the actual world there are no
individualities and no characters, but everyone is like everyone else; but the
presumed individuality really only exists in someone’s mind, an imaginary
existence which has no abiding place in this world, where only that which
externalizes itself, and, therefore, only the universal, obtains an actual
existence.
G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit C. (BB.) Spirit
So I shall imagine myself for a fortnight or so at one side of a fireplace
of a country cottage, with a sympathetic soul opposite me.
John Dowell
In a review of Ford’s three volume travel tome The Great Trade Route (1937),
Graham Greene writes that Ford escaped the chaos and urbanity of the “big individual
capitalist and the small communist cog” by styling himself the “small producer” (161).
Ford would ideally, Greene goes on to say, “have every man a part time agriculturalist,
because such a man is free in a sense unrecognized by either the Fascist or Communist,
free from the state ideal” (161). Here, Greene offers us a portrait of Ford as a man in
retreat—in retreat from industry, from the growing power of the state and the bizarrely
unorthodox ideologies that lie behind its growing power. While Greene’s comments seem
to fairly represent the Ford of the twenties and the thirties, Ford’s writings before the war
had shown no intentions of backing down from the communist activist, the capitalist
giant, or the unruly state. In the midst of a barrage of pre-war and wartime radical social
commentary, including three political satires, essays of social criticism published in the
English Review, and a book of war propaganda, Ford composed and published The Good
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Soldier (1915), by far one of his most private works, an intimate exploration of individual
consciousness.
However, we find The Good Soldier’s publication placed only three years after
Ford’s most explicitly political work. Published in 1911, The Critical Attitude explains,
from a historical and sociological point of view, why a “disease of thoughtlessness” has
taken a hold of the English people in its author’s time. In the Critical Attitude, Ford
laments the passing of “the great figure,” who in England’s past possessed the “literary
consciousness” (33), a state of mind bequeathed with the ability to effect “the bringing of
humanity into contact, person with person” (23). Here, he speaks of the novelist, a figure
that who’s importance, he maintains, the social conditions English of modern English life
have progressively undermined. In modern England, novelists find themselves replaced
by the “specialist” (22), a cultural figure that expresses society’s obsessive materialism, a
fact made clear to Ford through the shift in the English academy’s pedagogical strategy
from “the marshaling and the analysis of facts” to the “instruction that merely teaches
their collection” (22). This trend signifies an object fetishism that severely obstructs the
critical placement of value onto any aspect of English life. Thus, English society
compartmentalizes knowledge into atomized sects that value the collection of information
over the consideration of that information’s value to the individual.
These atomized sects, of course, are the ruling spheres of the specialists. In The
Critical Attitude, Ford accuses science, politics, education, and the arts of surrendering
themselves to the specialist. However, he seems especially concerned with criticizing the
historian for transforming England’s historical consciousness into a glut of facts and
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figures. This is due to the fact that he sees the social function of the historian as that he
most comparable to the novelist, the waning great figure of English society. “It is almost
impossible…” Ford writes, “to name any historical work of late that has an educational,
as opposed to instructional, weight … because the writing of such works have fallen into
the hands of the schoolmaster or the specialist” (22).
This connection between historical writing and novelistic concerns seems more
reticent in light of the fat that Ford had, four years before composing the Critical
Attitude, completed his impressionist sociological survey of the English people called
England and the English (1907), a work in which he seeks to discover the “Historic
Spirit” of England by uniting the “groups of facts, groups of maps, [and] groups of
engravings” to tease out “a great English Theory” (257). Here, Ford uses an early version
of his impressionist technique to subsume the factual evidence of English history into a
totalized understanding of the English consciousness at present. In her critical appraisal
of England and the English, Harriet Y. Cooper suggests that Ford’s history stood as both
an early pronouncement of his conviction that “the novelist should stand as the historian
of his time” with the obverse implication that “the historian should have a novelist’s
talents—insight into character and a focused seasoned vision” (191). At the foundation of
Ford’s social theories of literature, which he would strive to perfect later in The English
Novel (1929) and his last work The March of Literature (1938), stands the idea that
novelistic writing and historical writing are inextricably linked through the conscious
efforts required to produce them.
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Ford’s concern with the relationship between fiction and England’s collective
historical memory is an essentially Hegelian concern. Even though Ford denounces him
as a typical Prussian warmonger22 in his first book of wartime propaganda, Between St.
Dennis and St. George (1915), Hegel’s insistence that historical knowledge come from an
unmediated synthesis of subjective experience and objective truth holds a profound
influence on Ford’s thought. Ford understood that the problem with specialized
knowledge was that it restrained the emergence of an all encompassing historical
perspective. “Today,” he writes, “we produce not so many great lives as an infinite
flicker of small vitalities” (66). He attributes this lack of greatness to an obsession with
specificity that restrains English minds from creating “a historic sense,” through the
encouragement of a study of “A meticulous knowledge of a small period” (22). This
specification alienates historical knowledge from the subject by fragmenting it into
incommensurable departments.
Novelists, however, deal with what Ford calls the creation of “atmospheres”
which manifest as “the appearance of natural objects and the utterance of thoughts not
immediately appreciable by hurried minds” (32). A “hurried mind,” in Ford’s critical
lexicon, stands for a mind fragmented and isolated by specialized knowledge. The
novelist, by rendering “not facts,” but “the value of his temperament” (23) rejoins the
subject to historical knowledge by offering it a view of life unmediated by specialist
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In Between St. Dennis and St. George, Ford writes, “whether it be Wagner, Nietzsche, Kant, or Hegel—every one
of these Teutonically [sic] eminent has accepted war as a part of a theory of state about which they find it necessary
to write” (33). Later, Ford cites Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1820) as evidence for this designation, claiming that
Hegel believes that “the waging of war is the first object of state,” and that the German philosopher praises war “on
moral grounds” (259).
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categories—a frank expression of the totality of lived experience engendered through the
English historical temperament. Thus, as he notes in his 1924 remembrance of Joseph
Conrad, “the general effect of a novel must be the general effect life makes on mankind”
(180 “Joseph Conrad”), a reflection of reality unmediated by hierarchies of knowledge or
objectified facts.
In spite of the fact that Ford, in his characteristic elusiveness, dismisses the
passing of the great figure as “not in itself a thing to be wholly lamented” (45), he does
insist that the great figures return would reverse many of the ills he extrapolates on in The
Critical Attitude:
The appearance of a great body of imaginative effort, the work of
authors single minded in their effort to express, and felicitous and successful in
expressing, in imaginative terms, all that is most real, most permanent, and
most fugitive in life around us—the appearance of such… would have to be
regarded as an event at least as important in the history of civilization as the
recording of the will of a sovereign people… and the nearer [this imaginative
effort] comes to registering the truth… the nearer it comes to being a historic
event itself. (15 italics mine)
The idea that novelists’ “imaginative effort” equates to the “recording of the will of a
sovereign people” suggests that the act of novel writing carries with it a historical and
social capability that the absence of, in Ford’s estimation, would be detrimental to not
only writers and artists but the people who they are charged to represent. However, as
Ann Barr Snitow notes, the problem with Ford’s argument in The Critical Attitude is
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that it “pretends to discuss causes and effects, but causes recede into a realm of
vagueness while effects loom large and most of Ford’s rushing energy is lavished on
their description” (132). Ford’s wild and often undecipherable associative thinking
often leaves the reader unsure of what exact social trends or historical phenomena he
wants to see reversed. Several hints are made towards the displacement of artists in
culture, commercial trends threatening the truth or integrity of art, and shifting popular
demands that value fanciful entertainment over critical introspection. But what, at the
center of English society, causes these destabilizing effects? Why is the novel and the
novelist in danger? To answer these questions, I turn to the deft and often selfconscious aesthetics of The Good Soldier.

The Flagging Novelist
Recently, there have been a handful of critical attempts to suggest that, bound up
within Ford’s construction of The Good Soldier, rest a series of artistic commentaries.
Particularly, Jeffry Mathes McCarthy and Damon Marcel DeCoste have engaged in a
debate over how some of Dowell’s comments about painting and aesthetics could be read
to shed new light into Ford’s often murky and ill defined feelings towards Vorticist
aesthetic theories.23 Even though this exchange doesn’t apply directly to my project, it
23

McCarthy and DeCoste’s debate is worth noting even though it doesn’t interest my study directly. Both critics
seem to agree that The Good Soldier expresses some kind of critical and aesthetic commentary on the Vorticist
movement. However, they disagree in what exactly Ford is saying. In his reading of The Good Soldier , McCarthy
claims that Dowell’s stance as both narrator and cohort in the action he narrates expresses Ford’s “optimism that
modernism is the way for people to first understand the challenges of their social moment and then bond in a
common understanding” (333). DeCoste, in response, suggests that it is exactly “Dowell’s pursuit of an Imagistic
art and life” (113) through his telling of the story that prevents successful narration, and thus we should read the
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does show a general critical interest in the idea that we can read Dowell’s struggle to
narrate The Good Soldier as a commentary on novel writing as an aesthetic practice. We
might even go so far as to read Dowell as a figure for the modern novelist—to suggest
that Dowell’s aesthetic practices might have some baring on our understanding of the
great figure’s role in Ford’s ideal society.
Ford wrote in his 1927 dedicatory letter to his wife Stella that he has always “been
mad about writing” and that he has “to this date made exhaustive studies into how words
should be handled and novels constructed” (xx). He then claims The Good Soldier as a
result of these studies. The way past critics have understood these studies might explain
why the idea of Dowell as a figure for the modern novelist has only recently come into
conversation. Famously, Richard Cassell attributes Ford’s stylistic genius to his ability to
undercut Dowell’s choppy and inconsistent (although often times eloquent) storytelling
with his own highly calibrated and carefully selected series of images and impressions,
creating what Cassell calls the novel’s “progression d’effet” (176).24 This method of
understanding The Good Soldier’s structure, however useful it might be for explaining the

novel as “a work of cautionary and prescient insight, identifying at the moment of high modernism’s first
coalescence the antihumanist impulses that align it disastrously with the hierarchies of the past and the forces of
political reaction” (117). For reasons I am about to elucidate, my reading tends to correlate with McCarthy’s
understanding of the novel’s relationship to pre-war modernism.
24

Cassell writes that Ford’s “device of memoirs written by a rambling narrator is a ruse. With its dislocations in
time and its free movements between reporting, evaluating, and questioning, it is a method to conceal art…
Naturally, Ford treated time as an aesthetic, rather than a philosophical, principal, and more and more in his work he
sees the time shift as an artificial structuring device … to offer the juxtaposition of temperaments, meanings, and
metaphors, and to develop a progression d’effet” (176). It’s difficult to deny a larger, more artificial ordering
principal behind Dowell’s botched storytelling, and it is not my intention to do so. However , I do criticize the
implications of Cassell’s use of the term “conceal” to describe the relationship between Dowell’s conscious
arrangement of the tale and Ford’s larger designs because it implies that Dowell’s own aesthetic sensibilities are
designed antithetically to Ford’s, as a distraction from his larger structural scheme.
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intricate relationship between Ford and his narrator, implies that Dowell’s conscious
attempt and subsequent failures to reconstruct a the Ashburnham tragedy serve as a foil for
the success of Ford’s own artifice. Thus, readers assume that Ford’s relationship to Dowell
in the text constitutes a purely negative irony—that, for Dowell, conscious attempts to at
successful narration fail, but his unconscious slips and foibles create opportunity for Ford
to intervene in constructing a design larger than Dowell’s paltry ambitions can convey.
But framing Ford and Dowell’s relationship as one between artist and foil
marginalizes the fact that Dowell has aesthetic sensibilities of his own. Dowell’s many
reflexive meta-commentaries on his own storytelling contain, in their own way, elements
of Ford’s own “exhaustive studies” on writing. In “On Impressionism” Ford suggests that
his theory of fiction rests on the tension between perception and memory. These two
elements of consciousness form, for Ford, the elemental matter of fictional art. The
consciousness that is simultaneously aware through sensory impressions of its present
being-in-the-word and its past must learn to negotiate between the two when it constructs a
narrative. Thus, the goal of the literary impressionist is to:
Render those queer effects of real life that are like so many views
seen through a bright glass—through a glass so bright that whilst you perceive
a landscape or a backyard you are aware that, on its surface, it reflects the face
of a person behind you. For the whole of life is really like that; we are almost
always in one place with our minds somewhere quite other. (41)
Ford calls this process rendering the effects of “superimposed emotions” (41). Like Eliot’s
“mixing memory and desire,” the impressionist must present the “objective” truth of a
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moment through the endless chain of memories and associations it conjures. The opening
passages of The Good Soldier suggest that Dowell shares Ford’s challenge. Unlike
Conrad’s localized an anonymous narrator observing Marlow’s storytelling process in
Heart of Darkness (1899), or the psychological introspection of a dislocated narrator in
James’ Portrait of a Lady (1881), Ford situates his reader within Dowell’s consciousness,
isolated from any objective standpoint from which the reader can judge the truth or
relevance of Dowell’s claims. But in exchange for objective truth, Ford offers us an
intimate meta-fictional portrait of a story coming into being.
From this standpoint, Ford allows us to witness Dowell’s confrontation with the
impressionist struggle between the present and the past:
Permanence? Stability! I can’t believe it’s all gone… Upon my word
our intimacy was like a minuet, simply because on every possible occasion and
in every possible circumstance we knew where to go, where to sit, which table
to choose; and we could rise and go, all of us together, without any signal form
any one of us, always to the music of the Kur orchestra. (8)
Dowell’s relationship with the Ashburnhams conformed to the tranquil ascendancy of
high art, a harmonious dance of mutual desire and understanding. But in a sudden turn
it transforms itself into “a prison full of screaming hysterics” (9). We soon learn that
the stability of Dowell’s married life was undermined by his wife and best friend’s
betrayal of his sacred trust. “Permanence” then transforms itself from a mourned loss
into a sneeringly painful reality. Dowell finds himself aware of both the memory of his
past harmony and the present realization of its falsity. Thus, he asks: “If for nine years
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I have possessed a goodly apple and discover that it is rotten to the core and discover
its rottenness only in nine years and six months less four days, isn’t it true to say that
for nine years I possessed a goodly apple?” (9). His question strikes right at the heart
of objective truth: what is the reality of his story, the impressions of his experience, or
what he now knows about those impressions? Both seem equally valid, but he must
choose one, or at least come to an understanding through the narration of his story
how one became the other.
Thus, Dowell must resolve the tension between tranquil memory and traumatic
realization. To accomplish this, he employs the aesthetic tools of the novelist. We should
remind ourselves of Susan Sontag’s injunction that literary style functions as “a mnemonic
device” designed to “preserve the works of the mind against oblivion” (34-35). So many
essential features of literary style ultimately depend on repetition, symmetry, and
contrast—the tools of memory. Dowell’s failures as a storyteller stem from his tendency to
obsess over meaningless details, usually located in quantifiable objects or actions. In
Nauheim, he recalls the landscape of the spa by counting his steps:
From the hotel Regina you took one hundred and eighty-seven paces,
then, turning sharp, left handed, four hundred and twenty took you straight
down to the fountain. From Englischer Hof, starting on the sidewalk, it was
ninety-seven paces and the same four hundred and twenty, but turning righthanded this time. (24)
Dowell’s obsessive counting offers him a refuge from the loneliness of his life as a
nursemaid. However, the same kind of obsession pervades his storytelling, and he often
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fails to account for important events because he finds himself overly engaged with the
impressions of a single personality. By the end of the novel, he wearily complains that “it
is so difficult to keep these people going. I tell you about Leonora and bring her up to date;
then about Edward, who has fallen behind. And then the girl gets hopelessly left behind”
(241-42).
The juxtaposition of Dowell’s step counting at Nauheim and his complaints about
“keeping all [his character’s] going” reveals a tendency to repress the painful moral
ambiguity of his story through focused obsession. As the step counting image suggests,
Dowell struggles to tell a coherent story because he often fails to look up from his
momentary obsession and view his surroundings. This means of coping with the trauma of
the Ashburnham tragedy, however, finds itself contrasted with a markedly different
psychic refuge. As Miriam Bailin suggests, the aesthetic pleasure of literary style often
solidifies moments of uncharacteristic coherence and tranquility for the rattled Dowell.
Bailin writes, “when the comforting ‘minuet’ of Dowell’s association with the
Ashburnhams falls apart under the pressure of private needs and desires … he seeks the
‘discreet shelter’ of his own aesthetic conventions” (70). Ford’s narrator possesses his own
private arsenal of aesthetic techniques to mediate the struggle between rememoration and
repression. Bailin goes on to note that Dowell can, “distance himself from the disturbing
implications of the story he feels impelled to record both by providing himself with a
refuge in his self-designated role as detached narrator and by variously containing and
displacing in numerous aesthetic frameworks the emotional and moral quandaries with
which he wrestles” (70). Our interest here lies with the larger social and historical
implications of aesthetics as a mechanism for coping with trauma, with symmetry and a
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sense of completion as a superior means of escape from moral and emotional ambiguity
than brute repression.
In the opening pages of The Good Soldier, Dowell carefully constructs an aesthetic
refuge from the trauma of his experiences. He admits that his initial framework for
narrating his story is a complete fantasy:
I shall imagine myself for a fortnight or so at one side of the fireplace
of a country cottage, with a sympathetic soul opposite me. And I shall go on
talking, in a low voice while the sea sounds in the distance and overhead the
great black flood of wind polishes the bright stars. From time to time we shall
get up and go to the door and look out at the great moon and say: “Why, it is
nearly bright as in Provence!” (15)
Dowell’s fantasy of authorial displacement presents us with a metaphor for the ideal stance
of the great figure in society. The Great Figure’s engagement with the world is
paradoxically private; Dowell talks “in a low voice” to a “sympathetic soul.” Therefore,
Ford’s ideal novelist experiences the uncontrollable forces of nature and history from a
standpoint of simultaneous awareness and removal. The “sea sounds in the distance” and
he is unscathed by the “great black flood of wind” allowing its force to interact with the
rest of the world in a moment of apparent aesthetic harmony “polish[ing] the bright stars.”
Thus, from a point of candid shelter, the great figure can understand the world as a totality
that subsumes the chaos of individual moments.
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The larger historical and cultural implications of this passage might seem counterintuitive to the highly personal candor of Dowell’s story. However, in a novel that,
according to Frank Kermode, manages its epistemological complexity through the carful
use of equivocation,25 Dowell himself equivocates between personal and social history
when talking about the purpose of his writing: “Someone has said that the death of a
mouse from cancer is the whole sack of Rome by the Goths” (7). Like Ford, Dowell’s
understands history in Hegelian terms. Consciousness repels itself from itself in a constant
dialectical turn outward, from private consciousness, to social awareness, finally to a
totalizing historical consciousness. For Ford, it is literature— the private self’s outward
turn towards reimagining the world through writing— that guides this historical process
from solipsism to social consciousness.
In The March of Literature, Ford suggests that literary art provides an “an
imaginative culture necessary for all civilizations” (10) and in his assessment of the Aneid,
which Virgil candidly wrote “to give pleasure to a splendid friend” (216), he claims that
the poem provided the Romans relief from “a commonly received ancestry—which was
that of robbers and outlaws” (215) by reimagining their collective history with the more
noble idea that they were descended from survivors fleeing the destruction of Troy. In a
similar vein, Ancient Lights (1911) argues that France’s political instability in the
25

Kermode argues that Dowell’s intentionally deceptive use of the words “heart” and “know” as his two major
terms creates an “absence of simple complicity, of a truth vouched-for and certainly known” (111). This equivocal
use of central terms is reflected in the presiding structure of the novel, denying readers “a hermeneutic series that
ends in a discovered truth” (111). Thus, Kermode concludes that, with The Good Soldier, “we are in a word where it
needs to be said not that plural readings are possible (for this is true of all narrative) but that the Illusion of the single
right reading is possible no longer” (111 italics his). Kermode’s idea of the text-as-object’s complete destabilization
as a structural principal is interesting in its own right. However, we can use it here to challenge the hermeneutic
boundaries of the text by re-stabilizing it in another possible field of meanings using Ford’s critical prose.
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ninetheenth century could have been corrected, and the Franco-Prussian war avoided, had
more of the French read Flaubert’s L’Education Sentimentale. He claims that the chaos of
“governments [falling] at the shaking of the head of a purely selfish bourgeoisie” could
have been reordered by the “morals that [Flaubert’s] facts would have pointed out to the
French people had they read his book” (184). In an almost exact reversal of Jameson’s
thesis of the role of literature in the formation of ideology,26 Ford thought literature
provided a social identity that could paradoxically unite a people and raise them up into a
level of individual consciousness that allows them to criticize their society from a
historical perspective.

“Why are you all in the dark?”
Dowell’s aesthetic framework for his story, then, presents the writer’s attempt to
provide for the modern world with the “imaginative culture” that the great figures of the
past provided for theirs. At the same time, however, we see him searching for the same
ability in others, the evidence of a fundamental insecurity that suggests that the world
which Dowell inhabits is one that refuses its own imaginative introspection. In The Critical

26

Here, I’m referring to Jameson’s now famous pronouncement, found in The Political Unconscious, that “History
is what hurts, it is what refuses desire and sets inexorable limits on limits to individual as well as collective praxis”
(102). History is the trauma of inequality, marginalization, and class conflict that appears cyclical and
insurmountable. Narrative then, for Jameson, is “the radical restructuration of inert material… in the form of
Necessity: why what happened… had to happen the way it did” (101). Thus narrative as a socially symbolic act
works to bequeath a sense of historical necessity to the trauma of social and political violence, but it also reinforces
class relations by framing them as a teleological necessity to the development of order and social cohesion. Ford’s
thought differs from Jameson in its idealism. “The imaginative community” literature creates is the reality created as
an absolute manifestation of a people’s identity, and the violent trauma of life without this narrative act is a
symptom of a lack of cultural development.
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Attitude, Ford writes that the introspective critic’s success in English society is, at best,
short lived: “He lives if he has a chance, suspected, dreaded… then he disappears. He is
covered with the wax of oblivion” (2). Later, in the conclusion of The March of Literature,
Ford admits that great figures’ success depends on the acceptance of the culture for which
they write. These figures reflect the spirit of their age “because the people of the earth
demand nothing else… and what the Master shall command the hand of the slave shall
contrive” (850). Here, the novelists’ agency as a creator and arbiter of culture finds itself
engendered through the public’s reception of their art. Literature can only create a culture
if the people for whom the novelist writes recognizes its power to do so.
The English Novel provides a more specific historical indicator as to why Ford
thought pre-war England shunned it great figures. In his assessment of the modern novel,
Ford suggests that, after the disappearance of Wilde and the end of the “Yellow Book
period” (142), the English bourgeoisie could not develop a novelistic voice of their own.
The greatest Edwardian writer, in Ford’s estimation, H. G. Wells produced myopic visions
of a distant and utopian future that could not speak directly to England’s present. The other
three novelistic voices of this period, Henry James, Stephen Crane, and Joseph Conrad
wrote from an outsider’s perspective, and only James examined English life directly. Even
though, as Ford says, the people of England still thought that “the novel was a vehicle by
means of which every kind of psychological or scientific truth connected with the human
life and affairs could be very fittingly conveyed” (142), he suggests that the bourgeoisie
find themselves unwilling to offer up one of their own minds to explore how these truths
connect to them.
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Thus, Dowell’s naiveté as a puritan outsider charged with the tasks of
“sound[ing] the depths of the English heart” (5) presents an incandescent view into the
reasons why the English bourgeoisie refuse to submit their way of life to the novelist’s
scrutiny. Robert Green suggests that Dowell’s dual perspective, his position as both
narrator of and participant in the story he tries to tell, reflects Ford’s own feeling of living
in a culture “from which he was alienated by both birth and class” (81), but that he was
inextricably attached to through the development of his identity as an author. As the son of
a poor German printmaker who has established himself among the bourgeoisie, Ford’s task
of satirizing the English’s narcissistic refusal for introspection and the moral chaos that
results from it necessitates a narrator like Dowell. From Dowell’s pure and unassuming
insights into the people he seeks to represent, we receive an understanding of the
narcissism that the laborious social conventions of England’s middle-class desperately try
to conceal. At the same time, however, through Dowell’s emotional and physical proximity
to the story and its effect on his ability to recount it, Ford offers an understanding of how
the material conditions and social practices of English life fight against novelistic
representation.
Like in Tarr, I argue that Ford sees the rise of commodity culture as the
determining factor in bourgeois narcissism. However, unlike Lewis, Ford was not so much
concerned with how commodity culture created inauthentic individual tastes by directing
currents of mass desire towards commodified art objects. Instead, Ford was more
concerned with how the bourgeoisie’s used the commodity object to create an inauthentic
sense of self-empowerment that keeps individuals from acknowledging certain hypocritical
psychic divisions between public action and private desire. The Critical Attitude complains
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of a “flaccid and self satisfied commercialism” (11) that deadens the moral sense of the
English bourgeoisie. In The Good Soldier, characters use commodities to engender a
semiconscious sense of control over their identities as they unconsciously allow their
desires to wreak havoc on their emotional lives.
Sara Haslam suggests that The Good Soldier’s dramatic energy relies on Ford
animating his characters “with proportions of masculinity and femininity, of libidinous
capacity, that will cause a massive implosion once all is known” (55). Ford implicitly
makes Haslam’s “shifting systems of psychological and sexual knowledge” (55) apparent
in the novel. Florence, for example, asserts a more typically masculine attitude in
cuckolding Dowell and initiating an affair with Edward. Leonora, in response to her
husband’s careless passions, begins to manage their estate’s finances and the socially
devastating aftermath of his affairs. Dowell, conversely, determines himself a “eunuch”
(14) while his implied double Edward, the “raging stallion” (14) asserts a maternal
affection for “all children, puppies and the feeble generally” (30).
However, at the same time, each one of the characters, save possibly Dowell,
asserts some kind of gender-typical behavior at one point or another. As Haslam suggests,
the tension created by these shifting roles finds itself slowly accentuated by Dowell’s
coming to knowledge of their tenuous instability churning and raging behind public
façade: “with each new experience comes a concommitment development in the character,
an increase of knowledge” (57). Dowell gains mastery over his tale (even though he still
struggles expressing it) by slowly accumulating knowledge of the breakdown in clear
gender divisions that the other characters’ actions initiate. Moreover, his small victories
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represent an emerging understanding of other characters’ libidinal energies that supersede
their own self-knowing.
Thus, in a moment of brilliant irony, Dowell narrates the moment when Nancy
walks in on Edward and Leonora’s silent attempts to resolve the betrayal of Edward’s
affairs, the shocking deaths of Florence and Maisie Maidan, and the horror of his
incestuous desire for his ward, and asks, “why are you all in the dark?” (147). We could
very well imagine Dowell asking that question himself: “Your personal passions are
destroying everything, stable, solid, and respectable around you, what could keep you from
seeing that?” Ford answers this question through his carefully inscribed and highly stylized
character descriptions. In Edward and Florence, the novel’s two most destructive sexual
forces, we see Ford placing around them a distinguishable mass of consumer objects he
allows them to use as narcissistic projections of ideal selves. These commodity obsessions
obscure self-knowledge and leave Florence and Edward in a semiconscious arrest, unable
to deduce the absurdity of their own actions.
One of Dowell’s early portraits of Edward provides an example of this:
That was the sort of things he thought about. Martingales, Chiffney
bits, boots; where you got the best soap, the best brandy… the spreading power
of a number-three shot before a charge number-four powder… by heavens, I
hardly ever heard of him talk of anything else… And that was all I knew of
him till a month ago—that and the profusion of his cases, all of pigskin and
stamped with his initials, E. F. A. (28)
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“What did he even talk to them about,” he concludes, “when they were under four eyes?”
(29). Edward constructs his public persona through the consumption of commercial goods.
He finds himself able to idiosyncratically structure an identity as a good soldier by
participating in a market-driven fetishism of bourgeois luxury objects, signaling to others a
level of moral efficacy and material comfort he in reality does not possess. It is telling that
Dowell includes the reference to his pigskin cases stamped with his initials. Edward keeps
himself from acknowledging his libertinism by projecting a false image of his subjectivity
onto the objects with which he surrounds himself. When Leonora, after the couple’s return
from Nauheim for the last time, offers to divorce Edward so he can marry Nancy, she
walks in later to find him “in his evening clothes” (233) cleaning one of his guns. The
psychic trauma of his own desires drives him to cling to the implements of his identity as a
soldier and English gentleman. And when Edward kills himself at the mistaken suggestion
that Nancy no longer loves him, he fittingly does so with a “little neat pen-knife,” an
ironically genteel signifier of status and taste.
As an outsider desiring to surround herself with the refined prestige of bourgeois
English life, Florence unconsciously mimics Edward’s commodity fetishism. However,
Florence’s commodity fetish forms as an attempt to renew cultural and historical ties
from which war and immigration have separated her. Dowell reminds us that Florence
comes from an immigrated English country family, a “seriously impoverished and quite
efficiently oppressed” (890) clan of Tory loyalists whose American origins were stunted
by their political affiliations during the American war for independence. As such, the
aunts Hurlbird appear to Dowell as dried up comical parodies of gothic Americanism: “it
was almost as if they were members of an ancient family under some curse—they were
93

so gentlewomanly, so proper, and they sighed so” (87). Thus, Florence marries Dowell to
escape her laconic family and ensure her safe passage to Europe. Later, Dowell tells us
that he and Florence’s marriage was a ruse on her part, designed to fulfill “the main idea
of her heart” (98)—to take her place as “a country lady in the home of her ancestors”
(99), which just so happened to be Edward’s home county of Fordingbridge.
Florence’s longing for English country life manifests as a severe anglophilia—an
obsessive accumulation of facts about European culture and history. Unlike Edward,
Florence appears more aware of her knowledge as a means of deception, using it to
distance herself emotionally form Dowell, convincing him he had to keep her talking on
“the finds at Gnosssos or the mental spirituality of Walter Pater” (18) or she might die of
her “heart” (2). She also uses her position as a cultural authority to hold Edward’s
attention long enough to seduce him, the most notable instance of this being the two
couples’ trip to the ancient city of M. However, Florence’s cultural elitism still presents a
narcissistic commodity obsession that slowly undermines any stable sense of identity.
Thus, when Dowell, reflecting on the night of her death, tries to determine
whether or not Florence was fully conscious of her destructive behavior, he determines
that “she wasn’t real; she was just a mass of talk out of guidebooks, of drawings out of
fashion-plates” and that trying to stop her from killing herself (had he known that was her
intention) would be akin to “chasing a scrap of paper—an occupation ignoble for a grown
man” (134). Florence invests her identity in information commodities to equate herself
with a culture and class her family finds itself alienated from by over two hundred years
of life in America. As a result, Dowell detects her sham history, an inauthentic and
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commercialized sense of real historical connection to a people and a land that transforms
her into a comic figure. Thus, he concludes “that Florence was a personality of paper—
that she represented a real human being with a heart, with feelings, with sympathies, and
with emotions only as a bank note represents a certain quantity of gold” (133).

“A phosphorescent fish in a cupboard”
The final step in understanding The Good Soldier as a satire of bourgeois
narcissism as it relates to the commodity object’s restriction of self-awareness presents us
with the need to understand how Dowell’s efforts as a narrator ultimately fail. In posturing
himself as a great figure, we have already noted how Dowell creates an aesthetic
framework of simultaneous awareness and removal through his construction of the “fire
place in a country cottage” as an aesthetic refuge. The trouble for Dowell, in spite of his
growing knowledge of Edward and Florence’s unguided passions and the varied aesthetic
experiments he employs in his storytelling, is that this aesthetic framework collapses when
he tries to transfer it from the privacy of his interior to the chaotic world in which the
events of his story take place. Dowell finds that the experience of a “sympathetic soul
opposite” that he sees as central to his ability as a storyteller has no mirror in the reality of
his world. Thus, he becomes absorbed in the same narcissism that Ford uses his story to
satirize.
Sally Bachner notes how the narrative device of The Good Soldier, with its refusal
to clearly demarcate a difference between subjective experience and objective reality,
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necessitates the “aligning [of] one’s point of view with that of another in an act of love and
investiture” (105). She goes on to suggest that, in the novel’s world, “identification with
another is a necessary precondition for revelation” (105). However, we must be careful, in
a world where unarticulated sexual desire masked in benevolence but “ending in
absorption” (171), to differentiate between the identification true love provides and
identification tainted by desire. In developing his concept of recognition, Hegel
differentiates between identification as love and identification as sexual desire. In his now
famous analysis of Sophocles’ Antigone, we see a characterization of desireless
identification:
The brother, however, is for his sister a passive, similar being in
general; the recognition of herself in him is pure and unmixed with any natural
desire. In this relationship, therefore, the indifference of the particularity, and
the ethical contingency of the latter, are not present; but the moment of the
individual self, recognizing and being recognized, can here assert its right,
because it is linked to the equilibrium of blood and is a relation devoid of
desire. (275 italics mine)
The “moment of the individual self, recognizing and being recognized” presents
Dowell’s emotional impetus in The Good Soldier. In Hegel’s terms, Dowell needs a
“sister;” someone with which he can experience a mutual recognition, subject to
subject, uninterrupted by the objectifying tendency of “natural desire.”
We find sexual desire strangely absent in our understanding of Dowell’s
psychology. When recounting the events leading to his marriage Dowell asks, “why
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does one do things? I just drifted in and wanted Florence” (17). Dowell’s courtship has
none of the impulsive drive of sexual desire, setting the subject on the world to
perform a list of accomplishments, “things” as he calls them, to show the other
worthiness as a sexual partner. Similarly, Dowell admits that, even though he “loves”
Leonora, he “never had a trace of what is called the sex instinct towards her” (35), and
commenting on his ambition to marry Nancy, he hints at something similar: “I wanted
to marry her as some people wanted to go to Carcassonne” (134). Ford, then, appears
to chose a passionless narrator to tell his “tale of passion,” suggesting that a certain
amount of authorial removal presents itself as a necessity even when the story must
come directly from the author’s perception of events.
That Dowell lacks the “sex instinct” (and his maladroit use of a scientific term
when talking about his own interior psychology should lead us to believe he is telling
the truth), does not mean that he is indifferent to the bonds of human contact. The
whole novel, in a way, presents Dowell’s internal drive to find a person in which he
can recognize himself. In the novel’s opening he complains that he finds himself
“horribly alone” due to the fact that he knows nothing “of the hearts of men” (9). Later
he concedes that “we all need from the outside the assurance of our own worthiness to
exist” (127). Dowell, as the novelist, cannot face the horrors of human passion and
betrayal without the mutual assurance of his validity, both as an observer of human
sorrows (as we see with the “sympathetic soul opposite” in his cabin) and as someone
who has experienced those sorrows personally. Many of his labyrinthine digressions
into character present a search for an impression that confirms this connection.
Through Florence’s “play acting” (131) he can find nothing of a real interior. With
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Edward he suffers from a clear misrecognition. “For I can’t conceal from myself,”
Dowell writes, “that I loved Edward Ashburnham—and that I loved him because he
was exactly myself” (275 italics mine). Edward, of course, is not John Dowell. Seeing
that Dowell neither excites his sexual passions nor qualifies as a legitimate peer in his
sham coterie of masculine heroism, Edward refuses Dowell as a man of his standing,
talking to him “not so much as a man” but as if he “were a woman or a solicitor” (31).
In Leonora, however, Dowell finds a different kind of misrecognition. Dowell says
she would listen to him with “air of inattention as if she were listening, a mother, to the
child at her knee” (53). Dowell’s impressions of Lenora, then, appear faintly to resemble
the conscious attitude of the novelist. Thus he attempts to project his position as narrator
onto her in an attempt for mutual recognition:
I swear that Leonora, in her restrained way, gave the impression of
being sympathetic. When she listened to you she appeared to be listening to
some sound that was going on in the distance. But still, she listened to you and
took in what you said, which, since the record of humanity is a record of
sorrows, was, as a rule, something sad. (225 italics mine)
The object of this passage, of course, presents itself as Dowell’s (possibly misguided)
impressions of Leonora’s predilection to sympathy. However, Dowell qualifies her
attentiveness with something like the superior awareness he feels in his imaginary position
as storyteller. Like the waves and the wind enveloping but not invading his cottage,
Dowell’s description of Leonora includes an attentiveness to the world outside of the
private sphere of their tête à tête. We must keep in mind that by now, Dowell has serious
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doubts as to whether he can penetrate the chaotic surface of his story’s events to
understand the dark and tangled motivations of its characters: “who in this world can give
anyone a character?” he asks, “who in this world knows anything of any other heart— or
of his own?” (170). Unsure of his ability to capture “the sack of a city or the falling to
pieces of a people” (7) bound up within the heartache and betrayal of his wife’s affair with
Edward, Dowell projects the ability of the great figure onto Leonora. The two switch
roles—Dowell recites his “record of sorrows” to Leonora while she, he assumes, raises
them out of the locality of specific time and isolated consciousness into a greater sense of
history as a whole. We learn, however, that he is mistaken his recognition of greatness in
another. Leonora, the novel’s portrait of modernity’s “purposeful efficiency” (155) in
exchanging the ruined bits of the past for the new, leaves him in Branshaw Teleragh with
her insane niece and the ghosts of Edward and Florence while she makes a new life with
Rodney Bayham.
Without the desireless identification of a silent listener, Dowell finds himself
forced to admit later that, “there is about [his tale] none of the elevation that accompanies
tragedy” (179). “Elevation” presents itself as the key word here for our study. Dowell,
ultimately and in spite of his efforts, cannot rescue the Ashburnham tragedy from the
trappings of locality and perspective because he cannot escape himself. Dowell’s failure
manifests as the reticence with which he finds himself slipping into the narcissistic
obsession with commodity objects. These objects, for Dowell, become trappings for
emotional difference when the emotional trauma of his recollection overcomes his ability
to narrate. Thus, they figure in to our study as the element of bourgeois English life that,
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for Ford, prevented his peers from producing a novelist that can show their existence in a
historical perspective.
Dowell is not an English bourgeoisie. However, he has “known the shallows” (5)
of the English heart. There are several moments when Ford allows Dowell to rescind into
the machinations of the English middle-class, allowing an interior portrait of their
narcissistic tendencies. We find the germinal anecdote for this narcissism’s effect on
Dowell’s narration when he imagines his wife and friends caught up in an apocalyptic
judgment drama. This passage presents a moving and energetic vision of finality and
resolution for the Ashburnham tragedy that carefully poises the moral weight of his tale
within a vibrant aesthetic framework, awakening the reader suddenly out of Dowell’s
previously incoherent ramblings:
It is almost too terrible, the picture of that judgment, as it appears to me
sometimes, at nights. It is probably the suggestion of some picture that I have
seen somewhere. But upon that immense plain, suspended in mid-air, I seem to
see three figures, two of them clasped close in an intense embrace, and one
intolerably solitary. It is in black and white, my picture of that judgment, an
etching, perhaps; only I cannot tell and etching from a photographic
reproduction. And the immense plain is the hand of God, stretching out for
miles and miles, with great spaces above it and below it… (76)
Aesthetically, this image presents a striking model of the process of Ford’s impressionism:
a sensory impression ignites a subjective impulse, Dowell’s terror in response to an
“immense plain” and “three figures.” Eventually, the subject offers up language to measure
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himself against the blank austerity of the impression (here I am referring to Heidegger’s
idea that poetic thinking is the foundation of language).27 Dowell determines that the
immense plain is the hand of God and the three figures are, of course, Edward, Leonora,
and Florence.
Dowell rounds of this image in an odd way, however: “they are in the sight of
God,” he tells us, “and it is Florence that is alone” (76). Passion in The Good Soldier is one
to one. There are three people in the image, so some one must be left to stand alone before
God. But why Florence? We can understand Dowell’s malice towards his wife. At the
same time, however, he tells us in the forth section that Nancy’s return to India left Edward
with “nothing left… but a dreary, dreary succession of days” (214), and Edward himself
banishes Dowell from his stable to face his death alone. Leonora, in the same way, could
reasonably stand alone in Dowell’s image. As an Irish Catholic, she is the novel’s cultural
outsider, and she is the only character to find some version of happiness outside of the
tangled passions of the Ashburnham affair, appearing at least to leave the novel’s events
behind her. Either one of the three figures could reasonably stand ostracized from the
remaining couple. Furthermore, we can assume that a universal and just judgment would
require all three to experience the ostracism that they caused at least one of the others to
experience in life. Thus, Dowell’s image fails to present an ideal justice in pictorial terms.

27

Heidegger thought that humanity defined its temporal and special locality in the world by “measuring” itself
against “the way in which the god who remains unknown, is revealed as such by the sky” (223 Poetry, Language,
Thought). Humanity measures itself against the immeasurable (i.e. the infinite) by introducing the sky as a mediating
image. This is similar to how Dowell “measures” the temporality and locality of his writing the Ashburnham tragedy
against his undefined impression of the pain it has caused him by renaming his impression “the hand of God.”
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As noted, such an ideal of justice, if Dowell wants to capture it aesthetically, would
have to resist locality, to simultaneously implicate all three characters, thus capturing the
real horror of the Ashburnham tragedy—that all three of these figures were as much
perpetrators as they were victims. The turning point in this image, the act of localization
that grounds it back in the particularity of Dowell’s malice towards Florence, is the fact
that he “cannot tell an etching from a photographic reproduction.” Reading this passage as
a narrative of the subject crafting an impression into an aesthetic image, Dowell’s inability
to tell a genuine work of art from a reified commodity presents itself as an obstruction to
something like the notion of “abrasion” (129) Barthes elucidates in his narrative analysis
“The Struggle with the Angel.” The structural phenomenon of “abrasive frictions” within a
narrative, Barthes asserts, “allows the juxtaposition of narrative entities to run free from an
explicit logical articulation” (140). An abrasion is a narrative ambiguity created by a
seemingly needless repetition, working to create a narrative condition where the story can
“hold its significance fully open” (141 italics his). In its process of coming to be, Dowell’s
image needs the semiotic freedom of open significance, the possibility of multiple
references. However, the photographic reproduction, as a simulation for which Dowell’s
cannot find a distinct reference, prevents his image from transcending the materiality and
locality of object. Thus, his attempt to find a meaning for his story that transcends the
moment of his telling—his attempt to create “the elevation that accompanies tragedy”—
crashes into the locality of the commodity object.
This is not an isolated incident in Dowell’s narration. Other instances provide
clearer examples of Dowell differing to the commodity object in moments of emotional
distress. While recounting the interview with Leonora where she reveals the truth behind
102

his wife’s death, Dowell recalls his state of mind that night, “it is some little material
object, always, that catches the eye and that appeals to the imagination” (118). His fixation
on the flask of what he supposed to be heart medicine, he learns retrospectively, kept him
from realizing his wife’s death was not an accident. However, while recounting the
incident, Dowell still fails to draw the connection between the flask and Leonora’s
revelation (we are forced to infer on out own that the flask did not, in fact, contain nitrate
amyl). In this instance, an attached focus on the object overcomes an attentiveness to the
context in which the object finds itself, the comingling of desires, diverging interests, and
desperate attempts to conceal the truth.
Earlier, Dowell complains that the does not have the “seeing eye” (16).
Paradoxically, his admission of deficiency reveals a hubristic overconfidence in his role as
narrator. Dowell naively assumes from the outset that his exploration into the concealed
depths of the English heart will reveal its fundamental truth, its “benefit of unknown
heirs,” as a result of him seeing and positively indentifying this truth. Thus he displays a
hubristic overconfidence in his role as observer.28 Dowell’s story presents the search for an
ultimate significance he cannot find, so he constantly differs the actual narration and
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Compare Dowell’s conviction that he must invest his story with significance to the narrator’s comments on
Marlow’s belief in the efficacy of a story in Heart of Darkness: “The yarns of seamen have a direct simplicity, the
whole meaning of which lies within the shell of a cracked nut. But Marlow was not typical… and to him the
meaning of an episode was not inside like a kernel but outside, enveloping the tale which brought it out as a glow
brings out a haze” (9). In the context of the story Marlow tells, we can interpret the narrator’s comment as the
suggestion that a narrative does not in itself does not reveal meaning, but that meaning finds itself engendered
through an audience’s reception. Thus, the “kernel” of Marlow’s tale is the recounting of his journey up the Congo
river in search of Kurtz, whereas the “enveloping… haze” presents its reception by the audience on the Nellie, a
group of officious British imperialists who are (ideally) supposed to interpret Marlow’s tale as a foreboding caution
against the possible moral dangers of the imperialist mindset.
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replaces it with lackluster meditations on his own incapability. Thus, when Dowell learns
from Leonora of his wife and Edward’s affair he tells us:
No, I remember no emotion of any sort, but just that feeling that one
has from time to time when one hears that some Mrs. so-and-so is au-mieux
with a certain gentleman. It made things plainer, suddenly, to my curiosity. It
was if I thought, at that moment… that, when I came to think it over
afterwards, a dozen unexplained things would fit themselves into place. (117).
This promised revelation never comes for Dowell. He works through his story to its end
and still “knows nothing of the hearts of men.” The lack of significance he finds when
conjuring up his actual recollections of events forces him to compensate with a sluggish
materialism. Recalling the night of Florence’s suicide, he notes, “I felt no sorrow, no desire
for action, no inclination to go upstairs and fall upon the body of my wife. I just saw the
pink effulgence, the cane tables, the palms, the globular match holders, the indented
ashtrays” (120). Here, Dowell unwittingly confesses to a narcissistic attachment to his role
as impartial observer, privileging his ability to note the physical objects that surround a
situation over his duty to narrate.
This narcissistic self projection, the obsession with significance as the author’s gift
to the reader, severely impairs Dowell’s ability to narrate. His overconfidence in his own
role as storyteller finds itself mediated through the commodity object when he replaces the
significance he cannot invest in the story with catalogs of material things. Thus, he
conflates storytelling with inventory by investing his narrative with commodity objects.
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Informing his reader as to “what actually happened” the night of Florence’s suicide, he
writes:
You will remember I said that Edward Ashburnham and the girl had
gone off, that night, to a concert at the Casino and that Leonora had asked
Florence, almost immediately after their departure, to follow them and to
perform the office of chaperone. Florence, you may also remember, was all in
black, being the mourning that she wore for a deceased cousin.... It was a very
black night and the girl was dressed in cream-coloured [sic] muslin, and must
have glimmered under the tall trees of the dark park like a phosphorescent fish
in a cupboard. (121)
The commodity object has become a part of the narration, infusing itself into the act of
telling itself through the literary device of the simile. The actual image appears
nonsensical: “A phosphorescent fish in a cupboard,” fails (intentionally on Ford’s part) to
call a specific image to mind. It is the product of observation overcoming narration, of
the locality of endlessly homogenized and mass-produced objects overcoming the
explication of passion and confusion. Ford directs us to the realization that “A
phosphorescent fish in a cupboard” is the “picture” Dowell has “seen somewhere,” the all
encompassing reality of narrative re-localized into the faceless object. Like Edward and
Leonora, Dowell has crafted a role for himself using the commodity object, and it is this
role which Ford ironically exposes as a falsity. Listing of commodities presents a cheap
replacement for insight, a narcissistic delusion of Dowell’s competence as a narrator.
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Dowell’s failure, of course, presents an ironic indication of Ford’s success.
Dowell cannot narrate, but the very presentation of his failure indicates that Ford can.
The irony bound up in Ford’s choice directs us to insight that The Good Soldier has for
the possibility of a reemergence of a great figure within modern bourgeois society.
Commenting on his work with Conrad, Ford remarks on his shared conviction found in
Conrad’s preface to The Nigger of the Narcissus (1897) that the novelist’s duty is,
“before all, to make you see” (147). Ford claims that he shared this conviction with
Conrad because, “seeing is believing for all the doubters of the planet from Thomas to the
end: if you can make humanity see the few very simple things on which this temporal
world rests you will make mankind believe such eternal truths as are universal” (168
Joseph Conrad). The revelation of truth emerges from the act of showing readers the
world in which they dwell. Later Ford writes “you must not, as author, utter any views”
(208). Novelists, then, cannot relate significance into their own work editorially, but must
instead trust that the significance of the work finds itself manifest through the act of
reading.
Ford’s position as novelist in relation to Dowell ultimately implies that the great
figures must reinstate themselves to a place of social significance through the act of selfeffacing humility. Ford does not ironically undercut Dowell’s authority as narrator
singularly by means of any special ability. Narrative competence in The Good Soldier
finds itself supported by the tacit acknowledgement of the narrator’s own limitations,
hence Ford’s refusal to intervene within the narration. Ford limits the novel’s perspective
to the isolation of Dowell’s consciousness to show that novelists must act as servants to
their subject. To give the English bourgeoisie a historical understanding of themselves,
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he in a sense surrenders his story to the people for whom it was created, to, as he says in
the preface to his Collected Poems, “register [his] own times in terms of [his] own time”
(327).
From this we can infer that, for Ford, the return of the great figure to English
society can only be intermediated through novelists’ self-conscious humility. Novelists
must suppress themselves in presenting their subject. Thus, Ford’s irony in The Good
Soldier works as a kind self-effacement, with Ford expressing his superior abilities over
his narrator through anonymity. We can then infer that the place of the novelist in society
mirrors the anonymity of Ford’s absence in the narration. Novelists give their society a
superior understanding of themselves, but as the mediator between the social and its
fictional reflection they must remain unseen and unheard.
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Conclusion—The Cost of Authenticity:
Irony and the Humble Aggressor

Identification and distance, sympathy and removal— these are the terms with
which I have attempted to trace and correctly demarcate the “absolute irony” of Ford and
Lewis’ relationship to the subjects of their novels. As we have noted before, both The
Good Soldier and Tarr focus on the development of some kind of artist figure as that
figure fights his way out of the machinations of modern bourgeois culture. Fredric Tarr
paints and theorizes about art in a town full of bohemian fops who paint and theorize about
art. Yet, he insists on his own individuality, that he is the authentic artist, the most
“efficient chimpanzee.” John Dowell tries his hand at writing “the saddest story,” a record
of the sorrows caused by passion and betrayal that he desires to lay down for “the benefit
of unknown heirs or generations infinitely remote.” For Ford, he presents a type of the
novelist in the modern world, struggling to yield up a portrait of a class and culture that
seems to refuse its own reflection. Thus, both novels attempt to encapsulate the struggles
surrounding the act of creation in a world growing more and more hostile, either through
the material conditions of cultural production or the social practice of the ruling class, to
the work of innovative artists.
The social objective of Lewis and Ford’s art, as we see it manifest in Tarr and The
Good Soldier, is to satirize the English bourgeoisie. This relates directly to their concerns
with art. Bourgeois culture, particularly in its relationship to the rising commodity industry
of early twentieth-century England, stifles the development of authentic artists, and, by
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extension, art and literature that supposedly functions as a unique and dynamic expression
of their culture. Politically, both critiques come from the right. Commodities, in Lewis and
Ford’s thought, do not corrupt the authenticity of bourgeois England. Instead, bourgeois
England uses the commodity as a substitution for the introspective vitality that authentic
art provides. Commodity culture, for the bourgeoisie, presents a suicidal pool (both
figuratively and, in the case of Otto Kreisler, Edward Ashburnham and Florence Dowell,
literally) where they can drown in the absurdity of their narcissistic desires.
However, Lewis and Ford’s concerns with commodity narcissism differ in
important ways. For Lewis, art deco and kitsch form the basis of bourgeois mimetic desire.
In Lewis’ thought, the bourgeoisie are only semiconscious of their relationship between
action and desire. Ford would agree. However, Lewis’ concerns himself with how this
semiconscious state of arrested self-actualization obscures the demand for art. The
commodity, as Bertha’s ornately bohemian apartment show us, redirects the desire for
cultural expression through art into mass commercial channels, thus obscuring the
development of individual taste by conflating it with popular taste. Lewis captures this
conflation between individual and mass desire through his comically adept portrait of the
“Bourgeois Bohemians,” a group of faux cultural elites who use commercial products to
express a paradox of conformist individuality. From this “megrim” of individuality, art as
the objective rendering of reality cannot emerge.
Ford’s satire of the English bourgeoisie differs form Lewis’s satirical practice in
that he finds concern with the way his class (as much as they can be called his class) uses
commercial industry to create a delusory sense of public stability in the midst of private
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chaos. The way The Good Soldier’s characters use commodities as a narcissistic reflection
of their ideal egos, exemplified by Edward’s genteel English finery and Florence’s
guidebooks, creates a thin veneer over the moral turmoil surrounding their secret behavior.
John Dowell leads his readers to these cracks in their public persona, pointing out the
personal inconsistencies Edward and Florence create though their failure to understand
their own sexual desires. The frenzy of sexual passion coupled with the public delusion of
clam creates a trap from which these two cannot wrestle themselves from into a critical
state of self-awareness. Samuel Haynes calls this entrapment “the conflicting demand of
convention and passion” (55), between which the characters are, as Haynes points out,
“shuttlecocks” bouncing back and fourth. But Dowell is no more adept at articulating the
impressions of what he sees when he peers behind their public façade, forcing him to
admit that he knows nothing of “the hearts of men” (9). This is Dowell’s principal
insecurity, and this pushes him to become caught in the same narcissism that Ford seeks to
satirize through his narration.
Both novels feature an ironic contrast between the formal genius displayed by the
precision and self-conscious stylization of their construction and the failure of their
protagonist or narrator to repeat their authors’ accomplishment. Lewis’ dialectical selfdistancing necessitates an ironic turn in Tarr’s attempt to perfect the artist’s relationship to
sex. Finding Bertha pregnant with Kreisler’s child, Tarr forces yet another distance
between his self-perception and the role he occupies, this time of the artist as sexual
performer. Tarr agrees to marry Bertha in a move that (she thinks) constitutes his “denying
reality” and “ending… against himself” (311). Tarr’s denial here, however, is not a denial
of reality but another moment of self-distanciation. The irony, however, is that he must
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abdicate his “new promises and hopes of swagger sex” by charging back into the
“regularity” (311) of biological life, least he become too comfortable in his new and
fascinating tryst with Anystasa. This is the cycle which Tarr repeats throughout the end of
the novel, marrying Bertha while still seeing Anystasa, then when Anystasa leaves him and
Bertha asks for a divorce, Tarr moves on to another set of women who somehow represent
the elusive slide back and forth between sex as biology and sex as performance: “the
cheerless and stodgy face of Rose Fawcett” countered by a “swing back of the pendulum
of the swagger side” that Lewis represents with “the painted, fine inquiring face of Prism
Dirkes” (320).
To continue his self-distancing, Tarr must retreat from the position of artist into the
messiness of sex, an ironic turn that paradoxically forces him to betray his ideals in order
to preserve them. As Robert T. Chapman notes, “Tarr attempts to organize his life
according to ideas. His logic is faultless; his argument valid; but his actions are absurd”
(82). Chapman goes on to suggest that Tarr fails because the absurdity of all biological life
presents a fundamental truth in Lewis’ thought, and “to have Tarr succeed would have
been an evasion of this basic Lewisian truth” (82). While Lewis does appear to contend for
a fundamental absurdity bound up in all biological life, I disagree with Chapman’s
assertion that this is the purpose for the ultimate irony of Tarr’s situation. Tarr represents
the artist acting in the world, his final dependency on the unconsciousness of femininity
then suggests that the artist’s position (insofar as they interact with life) is an absurd one.
However, our very realization of this truth as readers forces us to assume the final turn in
the dialectic that leads to Lewis as the authentic artist, the supreme creator who completes
his self-substation in his work by negating his subjects with the hard biting laugh of the
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satirist. Tarr fails to completely manifest as “the new animal” that “will succeed the
Superman” (307) because the artist’s position in the world is absurd. However, this does
not direct us to an admission of the impossibility of Lewis’ ideal artist in the modern
world, because the artist interacting with life is not the artist complete. It is only through
their work that artist are completely actualized and their distanciation perfected.
In a similar way, Ford charges Dowell with the task of adding another chapter to
history’s “record of sorrows,” to capture the chaotic passions of a moment within the
novelist’s historical perspective. He bequeaths to Dowell the tools of his ideal novelist,
memories, impressions, and the longing for a sympathetic connection with another. But
Dowell fails in his task. His narration is fraught with admissions of ignorance and moral
ambivalence. “The instances of honesty one comes across in this world are just as amazing
as the instances of dishonesty” (39), Dowell laments. He goes on: “After forty five years of
mixing with one’s kind, one ought to have acquired the habit of being able to know
something about one’s fellow beings. But one doesn’t” (39). He appears to think that his
narrative hasn’t breached the particular gap between his wife and friends’ actions and what
he perceives to be their motivations. Thus the narrative falls apart. He leaves crucial
moments unexplained, accuses his wife and friends of villainy and then recants those
accusations, and adds Edward Ashburnham’s suicide—arguably the most crucial moment
in the narration—as a terse footnote at the end of his tale.
Read within the context of Ford and Lewis’ social criticism and their writings on
the fate of modern art, a more acute irony emerges. According to Fredric Tarr, “all
effectual men are enemies of every time,” and “with a fundamental divergence they give
112

the weight of impartiality to the supreme thesis and need of their age” (235). Artists’ call to
act as antithesis to their community requires perpetual isolation, or what Lewis would call
“a separation, limited in kind” (184 Rude Assignment). Yet Tarr himself, by the end of the
novel, becomes hypocritically dependent on others. Conversely, John Dowell, who Ford
postures as a novelist with “the province” of “bring humanity into contact, person with
person” (23), ends up alone in the absurd position of caretaker of an abandoned estate and
ward over a madwoman. Both figures, in failing to complete their creators’ ideal roles, end
up in social circumstances antithetical to Ford and Lewis’ ideal positions for the artist and
the novelist.
That this is an explicit case of “humble yourself or you shall be humbled” is clear.
Both Ford and Lewis’ affect some kind of punishment on their subject for failing to
actualize the kind of self-punishment that they seem to demand of the artist and the
novelist. In fairness, both authors insist that the artist’s suppression of self is universally
applicable. Lewis’ satirical aggression was egalitarian: “everyone should be laughed at or
else no one should be laughed at” (109 Men Without Art). The scorn of the satirist’s laugh,
to present itself effectively, must turn in on itself to become the scourge of the complacent
ego. Ford also insists on a kind of egalitarian critical pose; novelists must sacrifice the
prominence of their own voices to let the age speak through them. Thus, as he notes in the
conclusion of The March of Literature the great figure finds greatness through humble
silence, working as the “hand of the slave” (850) for a society of unknowing and ungrateful
masters.
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The divergence then between Ford and Lewis then appears to emerge as a
difference between where their self-effacement places them within their community. For
Lewis, the artist must distance himself from the community by objectifying the subjective
feelings that create the bonds of sympathy. These bonds, in his thought, are disingenuous
and narcissistically self-serving, so they must be destroyed at the source, the conception of
self he attributes to everything but the self. This should lead us to suspect whether or not
Lewis’ “nastiness,”29 his rejection by his social circles, his unapologetic criticisms of
patrons and friends, and even the brief endorsement of the Third Reich that earned his final
banishment from English society, was a product of his own cruelty and aggression or the
product of a society unwilling to accept the questioning of its own legitimacy. That,
anyway, is how Lewis would have it.
Ford maintains that novelists must be the “unacknowledged legislators” of their
communities. His liberalism, the conviction that “no one individual is intelligent enough to
be entrusted with the fortune or life of any other individual” (81 Return to Yesterday),
depends on the assumption that the community for which he writes will correct itself upon
realizing the insight that literature gives. He presents himself as willing to cede control,
and strangely he does so to a people he seems convinced that seek nothing but amusement
and sentimental reaffirmation from their reading. For both figures, the condition of
bourgeois subjectivity, as my readings of Tarr and The Good Soldier show, appears to be a
Gordian knot, something that cannot be altered through anything but destruction. (This
29

I chose “nastiness” as the summative adjective in describing Lewis’ presence in the modernist art scene based on
Hemingway’s now infamous portrayal of Lewis’ character in Movable Feast: “I do not think I have ever seen a
nastier-looking man some people show evil as a great race horse shows breeding…. Lewis did not show evil, he just
looked nasty” (109).
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destruction, however, takes place on a personal level for both authors; mass destruction on
a political level would be more disastrous than the present state of things.) However,
Ford’s conclusion seems to ignore its own premise; he depends on a society that
introspection to embrace the introspective capability of the novel.
Is the possibility of social liberalism and modernism coexisting then the result of a
flaw in logic? This may be the case. We must keep in mind that both these men create their
ideal visions through manipulation. Fredric Tarr and John Dowell fail because Lewis and
Ford wish them to fail. Even though both characters’ failures point ironically to
masochistic self-effacement on their creators’ part, they are still products of Ford and
Lewis’ will, so masochism itself becomes a self-aggrandizing fantasy. Lewis, it appears,
would embrace this as a fundamental truth; the artist’s masochism is in itself a round about
means of achieving control and dominance over the world through a perpetual removal
from it. However, Ford’s masochistic fantasy leads him back into integration and
acceptance into the community, even when a rough departure seems to present itself as a
necessity. Is his humble posture then genuine, or is it an incoherent denial of novelist’s
ability to cohabitate peacefully with the rest of their kind and still yield the full force of the
novel?
Satire itself seems like a kind of fictional removal, the creation of a fictional space
from which its creators can effect their ultimate supremacy as the possessors of reason and
clarity. Thus, it seems doubtful that a humble satirist can exist. A satirist can, as Ford does,
assume a posture of humility, but this is ultimately an officious accusation, a self-negating
humility that declares a moral attack. This should lead us to doubt whether or not an ironic
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masochism can comfortably coexist within the idea of an egalitarian community. Modern
novelists can attack their community from within but may never find themselves
comfortable with the hypocrisy implied by styling themselves “humble aggressors.”
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